

**Engagement and Implications for Future National Security Strategies:  
Can the Services Adapt?**

**A Monograph  
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## **ABSTRACT**

This monograph addresses the perplexing issue of ensuring US security strategy is coherently mated with emerging defense doctrines. America's current security strategy, "engagement," is inherently dynamic in nature. Consequently, it has surfaced four defense related issues: mission profiles beyond the design of US armed forces, debate over the role of US armed forces within an "engagement" construct, debate over the future nature of US Security Policy and doctrinal changes by the Armed forces to meet the demands generated by "engagement." This monograph investigates the challenges facing the US Armed Services to develop relevant doctrines adaptable to dynamic changes in national security strategies.

To meet the challenges of "Engagement" the services have adopted new doctrines affecting they way they organize, train and equip: USAF, "Global Engagement;" USN, "Forward From the Sea;" and USA, "Army Vision 2010." Simultaneously, "engagement" itself has been debated with three schools of thought emerging: the "dynamic," "selective" and "disengagement" schools. Consequently, a programmatic dilemma is emerging; while the services are actively developing new doctrines to satisfy national security needs, the more cardinal issue of long-term national security policy is unsettled.

The monograph assess the emerging service doctrines ability to meet the demands of possible future national security strategies by contrasting focus of each emerging service doctrine against the argument of each security strategy "school." It employs complexity theory, the historic dynamics of "great nation" foreign policy development, historic and contemporary views of US security policy and theories of international security to develop perspectives on the nature of security policy. It surveys components of US power and reviews the National Security Strategy (NSS) to evaluate the ability of the armed forces to support the NSS. Finally, it investigates the US security strategy debate and contrasts the emerging service doctrines against the three schools of security doctrine. It then considers the plausibility of each school with consideration to complexity theory, historical perspectives and realistic military capabilities.

The study concludes that future national security strategy will continue to emphasize security and economic prosperity founded on a stable international economic system. To ensure stability the US will remain internationally "engaged" in economic, diplomatic and military dimensions. The Armed Services have developed coherent doctrines that while challenged by current demands, provide the flexibility to address the fundamental demands of either the "dynamic" or "selective" schools of engagement.

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## **Introduction**

Adversaries have been observing the US in the period between Desert Storm and Kosovo, looking for weakness, searching for leverage. With each engagement, Desert Storm, Somalia, Haiti, and now Kososvo, adversaries have drawn lessons, increasing their understanding of how to counter US power. Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui's recently published Unrestricted Warfare is the most recent effort addressing the issue of managing American power.<sup>1</sup> This monograph addresses the perplexing issue of developing a security strategy that accommodates the dynamics of globalism and continues to achieve America's security goals.

As the United States enters the 21<sup>st</sup> century it is confronted with an increasingly unstable international environment, increased global obligations and finite defense resources. America's current foreign policy, founded on the notion of "engagement," both explicates the essence of ongoing national security efforts and attempts to provide solutions in a rapidly changing and unpredictable international environment. Four issues have surfaced as a result of this policy: new mission profiles beyond the Cold War construct for US armed forces, debate over the role of US armed forces within an "engagement" construct, debate over the future nature of US Security Policy and doctrinal changes by the Armed forces to meet the demands generated by "engagement." This monograph investigates the challenges facing the US Armed Services to develop relevant and adaptable doctrines to meet dynamic changes in national security strategies.

"Engagement" has created an environment of new expectations for military power. The seeming success of air power in an age of engagement has led this change, leaving air power as the newest preeminent symbol of American military capability. A number of incentives influenced this rise including: fiscal desires to apply military capabilities within tolerable expenditure limits, political desires to reduce risk and control casualties, a national fascination with technology and the need to respond rapidly to global crisis. Over the last decade these incentives have transitioned to expectations and now convey a picture of desired military capabilities by politicians, academics and strategist alike for all the armed services.

Unfortunately, reductions in force structure and funding levels during the 1990's have significantly restricted US military resources making the development of new capabilities problematic. The DoD currently lacks the means to simultaneously pursue the broad-based changes needed to satisfy new expectations and meet the continuing requirements of "engagement." The resulting "resource deficit" has understandably contributed to the increasing reliance on "efficient force" such as air power. However,

increased utilization of the US air power beyond its institutional design has in turn created a new series of challenges. Doctrinal efforts are now being pursued to bridge the resource gap and answer new challenges.

To meet the new challenges generated by the US "Engagement policy" the two prime air power sources, the US Air Force and the US Navy instituted a series of doctrinal changes over the 1990's. These new doctrines significantly affect the way they organize, train and equip their respective services. The USAF developed a doctrine entitled "Global Power, Global Reach" in 1992. This doctrine evolved to encompass an employment construct built around the "Expeditionary Air Force (EAF)" and by 1999 was referred to as "Global Engagement." Closely following the USAF efforts of the early 1990's, the USN also introduced a new doctrine to address the changing international environment confronting sea power. Its 1993 "From the Sea" doctrine emphasizing littoral warfare also engendered fundamental changes in the way it organizes, trains and employs. Naval doctrine, now called "Forward From the Sea," like Air Force doctrine, also transitioned in the late 1990's to reflect the expeditionary nature of "engagement" driven military operations.

While political and fiscal considerations have caused US air power to become the hallmark of much of the American response to world crisis in the 1990's its use has also created debate over national security policy and led to unanticipated side effects. The almost "reflexive" employment of air power to resolve diplomatic problems since 1992 has generated debate over the role of the military in conflict resolution, the measure of US national interests, the nature of US security policy and the structure US military forces. Increasingly sophisticated responses to air power by US adversaries (as witnessed in the recent Yugoslavian campaign) have highlighted the weaknesses of employing instruments of national power in an isolated manner (the role of the Army has been particularly highlighted). Consequently, the Army has recently been compelled to join the Air Force and Navy's doctrinal transformation and move beyond "Army Vision 2010." It is now developing doctrine and capabilities (the Chief of Staff of the Army's recently announced "interim brigade"), which increase the Army's responsiveness. However, the impact of this transition is still being debated and has raised a new series of questions regarding the Army's role in the nation's security strategy. These unanticipated side effects are having a profound impact on the chemistry of US military power and its ability to respond to the full spectrum of international crisis.

While the services are actively responding to events in recent memory, the more cardinal issue of long-term security policy is still being debated. Three schools of thought have emerged. They might be categorized as the “dynamic”, “selective” and “disengagement” schools of engagement. The simultaneity of discourse on both defense policy and security strategy creates a disquieting disconnect in that defense doctrine (and consequently structure) should intuitively follow and subsequently support national security policy. Yet military planners are making decisions that precede the security policy debate and convey long term consequences. This circumstance places military planners in the awkward position of simultaneously supporting an existing national security policy that severely taxes resources while at the same time anticipating what security policy will ultimately emanate from the current national security debate.

Institutional turbulence driven by the realities of an unstable environment and simultaneous debate over the future form of the nation’s national security strategy reflects the security quandary common to any transitional period. However, unlike previous transitional periods, the US unilaterally dominates the global order and yet remains dependent upon multilateral relations for future prosperity. These circumstances make flexibility imperative for institutions to remain relevant. Consequently, this raises the issue: Do emerging service doctrines provide the structure to expeditiously and relevantly adapt to dynamic changes in national security strategy?

The monograph is founded on a graduated approach to developing security strategies and policies in a rapidly changing international environment. It is intended to provide insight into many of the variables that prevent doctrine development in a vacuum. Complexity theory, historical perspectives, the inventory of US instruments of national power, the current National Security Strategy, debate over national security and the emerging service doctrines all contribute to the defining the direction of US security strategy.

Chapter One draws on the principles of Complexity Theory along with historic and contemporary views of US security policy to determine the viability of security doctrines.

In Chapter Two, the monograph briefly looks at the nature of dynamic foreign policy development from a historical perspective. This analysis evaluates the domestic and foreign policies of previous “great nations” against the backdrop of complexity theory.

Chapter Three addresses theories of international security particularly focussed on military, economic, political, and technological infrastructures are developed from research of prominent area theorists and

practitioners such as Paul Kennedy, Henry Kissinger and Walter McDougall. These perspectives provide a vehicle to understand the nature of foreign policy success and failure.

Chapter Four surveys military power as component of the nations total international power. To determine the relevance of the US armed forces in the American mix the monograph surveys the military instruments of US foreign policy relative to other sources of power.

Chapter Five reviews current US security strategy as developed within the National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy documents. It also evaluates the ability of the armed forces to support the existing national security strategy as a function of resources and operational success.

Chapter Six investigates the debate surrounding the future of US security strategy. The various debates are categorized into three schools of thought: “dynamic engagement,” “selective engagement” and “disengagement.” The argument supporting each of these schools of thought is explored and explained.

Chapter Seven concludes by comparing and contrasting the emerging service doctrines against the three schools of security doctrine. It then considers the plausibility of each school with consideration given to complexity theory, historical perspectives, existing security strategy and realistic military capabilities. Finally, an assessment of the implications for 21<sup>st</sup> century US security policy is provided.



## Chapter One

### **Complexity and Security Policy**

The evolution of future US security policy will be framed by the terms of a yet undefined complex global context. These terms will be determined by numerous factors including the actions of friends and foes alike. In such an ambiguous environment security strategy must be malleable. It must also be founded on a methodical construct to ensure variables and consequences are adequately considered. Complexity theory provides insight into how an institution can effectively manage dynamic ambiguity.

Complexity as it pertains to the world order, though more institutionally recognized today, is not a new phenomenon. There are numerous examples of nations failing to understand the complexity of world events as they were unfolding or the implications of actions they were undertaking. For example: the decision by the Trojans to bring the dubious looking horse into their walls, despite suspicions of a Greek trick; or the decisions of Napoleon and Hitler to invade Russia despite the well known history of failure associated with that judgment; or even the US decision to become involved in Vietnam despite FDR's reluctance following WWII and a plethora of warnings from knowledgeable US regional experts.<sup>2</sup> The challenge facing future foreign policy and defense decision-makers is to limit the errors derived from failing to understand complex systems and circumstances.

In his book, Complexity: The Emerging Science at the Edge of Order and Chaos, M. Mitchell Waldrop defines complex systems as possessing characteristics such as being "qualitatively different from static systems due to the unique dynamism inherent in each ...spontaneous and disorderly but not chaotic...a great many independent agents interacting with each other in a great many ways... adaptive in that they try to turn whatever happens to their advantage."<sup>3</sup> These characteristics, representing some of the attributes confronting foreign policy strategist, reflect the contemporary security arena. The great number of independent agents with varying and interconnected agendas impacting, and impacted by, US actions represent the complex system confronting US defense and foreign policy planners today.

Problem solving is often characterized by distilling problems into mathematical equations with linear solution paths designed to reach an ultimate (often-quantifiable) end. Consequently, problem solving is typically approached from the perspective of taking a problem apart, resolving it in digestible portions and then reassembling the solution. This mechanism of problem solving is generally unacceptable when

dealing with complex systems because the whole is often greater than the sum in complex systems.<sup>4</sup>

Further, the ability to recognize second and third order effects of decisions are more difficult to visualize when problems are dissected and each component systematically analyzed in isolation. Physicist David Bohm perhaps captures the essence of this bias most accurately when he states “the task (of putting the problem back together again) is futile – similar to trying to reassemble the fragments of a broken mirror to see a true reflection.”<sup>5</sup>

Complex decisions require political and military analysts to accommodate factors that are decidedly non-linear or irrational. They must capture non-mathematical (non-linear) issues such as political motives and mass psychology when developing policy. Self-organizing complex systems and chaos are governed by many non-linear dynamics. Consequently, seemingly innocuous events can produce large effects elsewhere. For example, Dean Acheson’s “perimeter” speech was meant to send a clear signal to the Soviet Union. The net result that North Korean leadership would perceive the statement as an invitation to invade South Korea was not anticipated.<sup>6</sup>

Foreign policy is not founded on finance, industry or even armies. These are instruments of national power. As instruments they are effective only if applied to effect a certain result. Their use of course implies unique human characteristics of both motive and consequence. Policy analysts must recognize that the human element is the most complex component of policy development. Unlike hard sciences that derive their validity from linear analysis and repeatable explanation, the humans in complex systems are not obligated to respond rationally or predictably to their environment. Humans are driven by two factors that introduce irrationality and instability into the equation – expectations and strategy. Consequently, assumptions must be introduced into decision making and it is imperative that these assumptions are well defined and thoroughly validated.<sup>7</sup>

According to John H. Holland (University of Michigan), complex adaptive systems possess certain crucial properties that can be used to derive assumptions. First, agents should be viewed as representing the full spectrum of actors ranging from individuals to nations. These agents are constantly affecting each other and consequently nothing is fixed. Second, there is no central control. Control is achieved through competition and cooperation. Third, within this framework there are many levels of organization. One actor is a building block for another in a “labyrinthical” arrangement. Consequently, the order is constantly

changing. Fourth, all systems anticipate the future. Their predictions and anticipations are shaped by previous experiences. The learning derived from these experiences must be tested to validate the assumptions they generate. Finally, complex systems occupy niches. Each niche is vulnerable to exploitation by other actors and this exploitation drives instability.<sup>8</sup> To adequately address complex systems policy makers must ensure they develop accurate assumptions to base decisions on.

Dietrich Dorner, author of The Logic of Failure, provides another perspective on assumptions in his distillation of complexity. He views the development of false assumptions regarding complexity as having four characteristics; complexity, “intransparence”, internal dynamics and incomplete/incorrect understanding. Dorner defines complexity as the condition of having many independent variables in a system. These variables place high demands on planners and force them to into simultaneous vice sequential processes in which side effects become increasingly important. As complexity is subjective, the more experience one has with complex situations the greater his ability to receive and assess “super-signals” and adequately visualize courses of action.<sup>9</sup> This is more commonly thought of as “pattern recognition.” “Intransparence” is the condition of not being able to see all the information or factors impacting a system. Internal dynamics recognizes that systems develop independent of external controls and according to their own peculiar “clock.” They do not wait for external stimulation to change or move. Consequently, planners are forced to react to time driven constraints and stimuli they cannot control. This forces decisions to often be tentative in nature and based on incomplete and imperfect data. Finally, problems are often resolved based on assumptions derived from shallow or incorrect understanding.<sup>10</sup>

Peter Senge provides a decision-making methodology to operate within a complex system in his book, The Fifth Discipline. He proposes eleven laws that govern resolution of complex problems. Many of these have manifested themselves in US security policy efforts.

1. *“Today’s problems come from yesterday’s solutions.”* Classic bureaucratic shuffle causes problems to shift from one area to another and consequently go unnoticed.
2. *“The harder you push the harder the system pushes back.”* Also known as “compensating feedback” this phenomena postulates that the more effort expended fixing a problem or improving a situation the more the effort required to sustain the fix.
3. *“Behavior grows better before it grows worse.”* Because there is an inherent delay in compensating feedback there is an initial period where a fundamentally poor solution appears to be producing positive results.
4. *“The easy way out usually leads back.”* Planners must be careful to avoid pursuing easy solutions because they exist in a familiar surrounding. Systemic thinking can alleviate the tendency to pursue simplistic or obvious solutions.

5. *"The cure can be worse than the disease."* Simplistic solutions can become addictive despite the damage they are causing. Non-systemic solutions often lead to ever escalating requirements for "more of the cure" making the cure more damaging than the problem.
6. *"Faster is slower."* All systems have optimal rates of growth. This rate is always slower than the fastest rate. Consequently, there are times when it is best to wait and do nothing.
7. *"Cause and effect are not closely related in time and space."* Cause is defined as "the underlying interactions most responsible for the symptoms." Effect is defined as "the obvious symptoms indicating there is a problem." There is little to support the notion that these elements are closely related in time or space.
8. *"Small changes can produce big results."* It is important to determine the points of "high leverage" to maximize efforts. If accurately determined quite often small efforts can generate large effects.
9. *"You can have your cake and eat it too."* Dilemmas arise from "either, or" choices. The dynamics of the choice can lead to solutions over time allowing to achieve both choices.
10. *"Dividing an elephant in half does not produce two small elephants."* The integrity of system is dependent on its wholeness.
11. *"There is no blame."* There is a natural tendency to blame the failure of solutions on outside forces rather than introspectively evaluating the solution process for flaws.<sup>11</sup>

Any planner who has addressed a complex situation has witnessed the realization of many of these laws.

For example, the US poured countless resources into Vietnam only to see the requirements to preserve

South Vietnam continually expand over time. This experience in Vietnam reflects law number two.

Similarly, despite good intentions, Bosnia is widely recognized as addicted to foreign aid. This

phenomenon reflects law number five.<sup>12</sup> Both serve to validate Senge's assertions.

Dietrich Dorner presents another view of problem resolution in a complex environment with his a four-step process to deal with complexity:

1. *"Establish clear goals."* These will provide the guidelines and criteria for accurate assessment of selected actions.
2. *"Develop a model and gather information."* Planners should recognize it is impossible to have perfect information. Efforts should be focussed on building structural knowledge.
3. *"Prediction and extrapolation"* allows analysis of the structure and trends to predict future developments as well as assess status quo.
4. *"Prepare planning actions for decision making and execution."* Recognize that ritualized actions are easier because we start from a familiar setting. However, they can be crippling by imposing conservative biases into the process. Conversely, new actions can produce innovative thinking but can slow down the process or cause increased confusion.

Dorner contends there are rarely perfect decisions and therefore rarely perfect actions. Actions must be constantly evaluated for their results and adjusted as required. Before altering an action analyst must evaluate the reasons for turbulence to ensure secondary actions are addressing the correct cause. Caution is required to avoid abandoning a good course of action prematurely.<sup>13</sup>

It would be easy to conclude that complex systems and problems are so dynamic that no appropriate solution can ever be derived to address them. This assumption would essentially concede chaos reigns

supreme. While incidents such as the Rwandan or Cambodian genocides would lead to this very conclusion, there is in fact a counterbalance to chaos, “control.” Dr. James Schnieder (The US Army School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas) defines “control” as “the regulating influence directed at a predetermined goal.” It has two components: first, “it is the regulating influence of one actor over another” and second, “the purpose of that influence is guided toward the a prior objective set by the controlling agent.” The notion of control establishes the fundamental foundation of society and, by extension, the international order. However, when applied against a complex environment controlling agents must recognize that change is inevitable and adjust their control mechanisms to reflect that change. This concept of adjustment sets the stage for the mediating aspect of control. Consequently, to be effective the results of control mechanisms must first be measured against the past and desired “goal” state. Secondly, the control measures must be adjusted to keep them on track with the changing environment.<sup>14</sup> By natural extension the controlling actions themselves will become part of the greater complex system.

The precepts of complexity theory are readily applicable to emerging US foreign policy. Despite their contemporary popularity, many have been recognized for centuries. Sun Tzu, recognized the essence of complexity with his assumptions on warfare and foreign policy when he stated “Warfare is the greatest affair of state and must be thoroughly pondered and analyzed...Careful planning and overall strategy is required prior to campaign design...Whenever possible victory should be accomplished by diplomatic coercion, thwarting his plans and frustrating his strategy” and finally “Subjugating the enemy’s army without fighting is the true pinnacle of excellence.”<sup>15</sup>

Policy making in the 21<sup>st</sup> century will likely embrace three levels of thought: conventional cost-benefit analysis, full institutional policy analysis or an emerging system combining neo-classical and complexity theories. All three constitute efforts to establish methodologies to manage ambiguity and uncertainty in security policy. Conventional cost-benefit analysis pursues equilibrium between the costs and benefits of individual courses of action. This approach is dependent upon well-defined problems and options with predictable political and human reactions. In its purist form cost-benefit analysis would reflect unadulterated national interest. Full institutional analysis determines who all the actors are, their agendas, motivations, alliances, etc. and applies this knowledge to the solution. This reveals critical leverage points for effective intervention. This approach, the art of understanding who holds power, what is at stake, what

alliances are likely to form, might be visualized as “politics” in its purist form. Finally, neo-classical theory combines with complexity theory to recognize that there is no duality between man and his environment but rather man (by extension societies and nations) is part of a larger complex system and every policy decision impacts not only the target but also the “targeteer.” These three approaches are intended to provide methodology to security policy decision making. They can be viewed as providing a national interest based “black and white” approach; a more flexible politically selective approach; and a broadly based “total engagement” perspective. Security planners are confronted with the problem of determining which theory is most applicable to any given situation. Waldrop contends the answer is to recognize change is perpetual (therefore achieving “equilibrium” is impossible), efforts should concentrate on observation and apply force only when maximum results can be achieved, as many options as possible should be maintained, and finally planners should recognize the viable solution is often better than the optimal solution.<sup>16</sup>

These insights provide a basis to consider security strategy. While not all inclusive, they constitute a starting point to consider variables and assumptions. They also provide considerations for developing control mechanisms to manage complex and ambiguous circumstances. Complexity theory can be applied to gain perspective on both historic and contemporary security policy and provide a vehicle to analyze military doctrinal changes supporting security policy.

## **Chapter Two**

### **A Historic Perspective on National Strength and Security Strategy**

The international environment is a complex and evolving system. As complexity theory points out, one of the fundamental requirements for the long term success of any institution is the ability to recognize change, adapt to it and emerge as an organization with new relevant strategies and strengths. A nation's security policy is one of these strategies. Security policy is not static. It is continually evolving and its relevance shifts in concert with the changing global atmosphere. Harvard scholar Paul Kennedy concluded the following in his work The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers:

“[There] exists a dynamic for change, driven chiefly by economic and technological developments, which then impact upon social structures, political systems, military power and the position of individual states and empires.”<sup>17</sup>

Unfortunately, there is no guidebook that provides national leadership with right and wrong approaches or scientifically derived formulas to answer the perplexing questions and situations about which security policy revolves. Fortunately, history does provide a reference to assess foreign policy decisions and their possible consequences. While history provides a gauge of past success it cannot ameliorate the fact that change is inevitable, sources of power are relative to circumstance, power and security policy are irrevocably intertwined and effective security policy requires constant moderation and change. This chapter, a brief investigation into some historic sources and lessons of international power and security, provides a frame of reference for complexity analysis, pattern recognition and security policy development. From this reference, insight into the heritage of American foreign policy, contemporary elements of American national power and the possible courses of future American foreign policy are better understood.

While every nation is guided by the desire to enhance its own security and prosperity, the continuing shift in “lead nations” throughout history indicates fulfilling this desire is neither possible nor sustainable. The contemporary American perspective on this issue is no different from previous great nations – an overwhelming desire to avoid becoming a “has been” power. The art of developing and implementing security policy to achieve this end is ambiguous. Unforeseen happenings, unexpected catastrophes and trend reversals are among the many variables that can topple even the best policy decisions.

Conventional and classic thought suggests the fundamental source of national power is founded on strong economic capability, potential and output. Paul Kennedy expressed the view that economics form the foundation of national power:

“[The] historical record suggests that there is a very clear connection in the long run between an individual Great Power’s economic rise and fall and its growth and decline as an important military power.”<sup>18</sup>

This assertion is reinforced by contemporary US thought in the National Defense Universities 1996 Strategic Assessment. This document concluded that the US economy, financial institutions and industrial base are essential to continued American strength.<sup>19</sup>

### **The Great Powers - A historical Perspective**

A historical survey of great powers that have dominated either regional or global affairs and subsequently faded into the shadows of subordination provides illuminating insight into the relationship between economic strength and international prominence. History indicates the rise and fall of great nations has been most commonly a function of lengthy conflict, the efficiency of the states productive base and the relative prosperity or wealth of the nation relative to the international structure it operates within.<sup>20</sup>

As Westerners, Americans tend to unconsciously presume the rise of Europe and the western oriented powers to global predominance was somehow foreordained. However, at the dawn of the 16<sup>th</sup> century there were numerous empires competing (albeit generally unknowingly) for world dominance. These included among others China, the Ottoman Empire and the Russian Empire. Kennedy asserts that in the end, the Europeans rose above the others because of the cumulative competitive effect of the lack of a central socializing authority, the continuing upward spiral of technology (generally driven by the demands of warfare) and a competitive entrepreneurial environment that supported expanding power and influence.<sup>21</sup>

The fall of China in the 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries can largely be attributed to the “isolationist” and “introspective” policies adopted by its waning governments. In the 1300’s China was as close to an international power as could be visualized. It dominated Asia with seagoing fleets and may have ventured as far as Portugal. Around 1433, the Chinese dynasties began to turn away from the international forum. While this shift appears to have been driven by pressing needs to attend to internal subversion, the international results were ruinous. Within 100 years Japanese piracy and Portuguese coastal intrusions were uncontrolled.<sup>22</sup> Despite the internal military challenges China confronted, the underlying reason for



its decline must be directed at the conservative nature of its Confucian bureaucracy. Efforts to restore Chinese eminence in an age of decline were focussed on preserving past glories vice expanding commercial trade. Further the government maintained a fundamental distrust of the military and viewed capitalism as offensive. All of this led to a decline in official support for expanding international trade, technological development and support for a strong industrial or military capability.<sup>23</sup> In sum, China failed to grasp the nature of a rapidly changing and complex environment it entered (willingly or not) when international community discovered and began to focus on China. Chinese failure to adapt and strengthen its sources of national strength eventually made development of an adequate or relevant security strategy impossible.

The Ottoman Empire was rising as the Ming Dynasty was falling. It would eventually expand to control the ancient "Silk Road," much of the Hindu Empire, Egypt, Syria, much of Africa, the Balkans and even into Hungary. At its apex it was on the verge of swallowing the Holy Roman Empire. During its rise the Ottomans demonstrated great capacity to adapt their policies to accommodate an expanding empire.<sup>24</sup> Over time however, the Ottoman ability to recognize and adapt to change ossified, signaling its decline.

The Ottoman Empire, like the Chinese, was also doomed to fall because it turned inward. Over-extension and the repressive nature of the central government towards merchants and entrepreneurs compounded the Ottoman decline.<sup>25</sup> By the late 1500's the Ottoman Empire was strategically over-extended and besieged by conflict on all fronts. The Persian Shiite's split drained resources and the seating of thirteen incompetent sultans caused the central government to harden and become self-preserving. Eventually innovative thought, dissent, initiative and commerce were suppressed. Merchants became targets of unpredictable and divisive taxes and the military became a bastion of conservatism. Both resulted in the suppression of technological and military innovation.<sup>26</sup> When the Europeans eventually challenged their dominance with better weapons, more robust economic systems and more responsive governments the Ottomans were unable to counter and entered into a state of decline. Ottoman efforts to master "internal equilibrium" ultimately led to an inability to adapt to external change.

After 1840 a significant change occurred in the concept of national power. That change, the replacement of territorial domination by economic expansion, would eventually lead to the emergence of Great Britain as the dominant world power of the 19th century. The convergence of several dynamics fueled Britains growth to superpower status. These included the rise of an international economic system,

monumental industrial growth, international stability, military modernization and short-term conflicts. By 1860 Britain dominated the world in terms of military, economic, financial and diplomatic prowess. It produced forty to fifty percent of the total global output and controlled twenty percent of the world's commerce. This is particularly notable because its Gross National Product (GNP) trailed both Russia and China.<sup>27</sup>

Lester C. Thurow in The Future of Capitalism captures the underlying reason for Great Britain's rise as an industrial giant in his theory of "Comparative Advantage:"

"[The] location of production depended on two factors—natural resource endowments and factor proportions (the relative abundance of capital and labor). Those with good soil, climate and rainfall specialized in agricultural production; those with oil, supply oil. Countries that were capital-rich (lots of capital per worker) made capital intensive products, while countries that were labor-rich (little capital per worker) made labor intensive products."<sup>28</sup>

Britain having limited natural resources, a large urban population and notable financial strength was naturally positioned to assume the lead in industrialization. This lead provided a quantitative and qualitative advantage as the nature of the international environment shifted from a territorial to an economic basis. Britain recognized this change and leveraged its new strength to full advantage.

While Britain trailed Russia and China in GNP its use of resources was much more effective. Most of Russian and Chinese production was immediately consumed fulfilling domestic needs. Unlike Russia or China, Britain did not spend an inordinate amount on defense or governmental bureaucracy nor did it organize industry to supply military needs.<sup>29</sup> Quite to the contrary, Britain favored Adam Smith's assertion that militaries were non-productive and should be maintained at a level to "[protect] society from the violence and invasion of other independent societies."<sup>30</sup> As a byproduct of the tremendous increases in British wealth and prosperity, society, industry and government all became increasingly disinclined and unprepared to pursue or support conflict as a political tool.

As Britain approached its' apex of power in the 1850's its military might was incongruent with its economic influence and world position. The government lacked the means and mechanisms to mobilize the country or industry in case of conflict. Britain depended entirely on the continental European system of "international balance" to preserve the peace necessary to support its economic engine. When that system faltered and Britain elected to enter the Crimean War it lacked the military, political and industrial capabilities to succeed.<sup>31</sup> For the first time Britain was confronted with the strategic weakness in its

national structure. Unfortunately, it failed to learn the basic lesson of equilibrium between its instruments of national strength. This imbalance would severely limit its ability to respond to changes in the future international environment. Britain had taken a course that would ultimately limit its strategic options.

Although the Crimean War (1854-1856) was a sideshow relative to the enormity of the 1850's British Empire it demonstrated how such a "limited commitment" could severely impair the greatest nation on earth. Britain entered the war as France's junior partner in the land war against Russia. It soon discovered its army was ill prepared to conduct warfare in Europe.<sup>32</sup> It lacked adequate logistics, medical services and training among other things. Tremendous losses (such as the Charge of the Light Brigade at Balaclava) and needless setbacks cost the government popular support at home and eventually led to a change in political ministry. More important however, weaknesses in British political and social order went unchallenged in the aftermath of the war. Though great debate was conducted regarding the difficulties of being a "liberal state at war" more salient issues such as the inability of the government to conscript soldiers, the lack of a trained reserve and the ineffectiveness of the Royal Navy to bring British might to bear on the war would be either ignored or rationalized after the fact.<sup>33</sup>

Britain's small Army would continue to be problematic. Despite its wealth, domestic prosperity and continual calls for more resources from senior officers (particularly those emphasizing the size of, and dependence upon, its empire in India), Britain did not prioritize the Army's needs as it did the Navy's. The logic of this policy was reinforced by the lack of competitors to Britain's colonial empire between 1815 and 1860. Britain, like most European nations, failed to grasp the lessons of mobilization and the possibility of another Great War derived from the American Civil War. In the end, the peculiar strengths of Britain were curiously also its weaknesses. Small governmental bureaucracy and army, reliance on sea power, political emphasis on individual freedom and freedom of the press, and the powers of parliament and individual ministers all combined to cripple Britain's ability to react to a crisis with a future serious competitor.<sup>34</sup>

British leadership insulated itself from these realities by assuring the predominance of its navy and focussing on the development of economic and financial strengths. British economic strength by 1860 was vested in its industrial and financial sectors. The two fed on each other to create an upward spiral in wealth and affluence. Britain invested a great deal of its new wealth overseas thus expanding its trade, communications and influence. However, these same investments were creating strategic weaknesses.

One of the by-products of overseas investment in industry, agriculture and infrastructure was the creation of competitors. This was especially true of nations such as the United States and Russia, which possessed vast natural resources and growing populations which could be coupled with emerging industrialization. Further, increased dependence on foreign trade and finance created an urbanized British population, dependent on foreign fees and natural resources. Since warfare would hurt Britains economy more than lesser states the lesser states began to enjoy a form of asymmetric economic and political power.<sup>35</sup> Again Britain ignored the indicators of a changing and reorganizing international environment and convinced itself that: it could readily accelerate to the next stage of national development and thus continue to outpace the competition; through proper diplomacy wars could be avoided; and its global position was preordained.

While Britain dominated the globe with a powerful and technologically innovative economy, strong political institutions and an insufficient military arm, Russia, a nation with a strong army but underdeveloped economic and political institutions became the dominant land power in Europe. From 1815 to 1880 the Russian Army grew from 800,000 to 909,000 men keeping it generally twice the size of its nearest competitor for nearly a century. The sheer size of the Army allowed it to wield influence over Prussia, Hungary and Austria. However, Russian power was in a state of insidious decline as other European powers enjoyed the benefits of the industrial revolution in the same period Russia was concentrating on maintaining its burgeoning army.

Between 1815 and 1890 the Russian population grew from 51 to 100 million, the number of factories increased from 2400 to 15,000, a Russian rail network was developed and GNP grew from \$10.5 billion to \$21.1 billion thus creating the illusion of a healthy economy.

#### **GNP and (Per Capita GNP) of Selected European Great Powers 1830-1890<sup>36</sup>**

(1960 US dollars, billions)

	1830	1850	1870	1890
Britain	8.2 (346)	12.5 (458)	19.6 (628)	29.4 (785)
Germany	7.2 (245)	10.3 (308)	16.6 (426)	26.4 (537)
Russia	10.5 (170)	12.7 (175)	22.9 (250)	21.1 (182)

While these statistics are impressive and certainly indicate vigorous activity in Russia they lag the rest of European development significantly and demonstrate that most of Russian growth in GNP was driven by population growth not increased industrial output. This is demonstrated by the fact that most Russian factory growth was limited to manual labor facilities with fewer than sixteen employees. Most important and telling of the true circumstance of Russian industrialization, Russia became increasingly dependent on imports and went from being an iron exporter to an importer during this period.<sup>37</sup>

The impact of economic weaknesses on the vaunted Russian Army was not immediately visible. Not until the Crimean war did it surface. While critical areas such as officer training and logistics were in a state of atrophy, it was the state of the Russian economy that would eventually cause the Czar to sue for peace. During the war Russian forces could not be concentrated and mid-level officers lacked the education to positively contribute to the Russian effort. Weapons could not be replaced fast enough due to a lack of factories and lacked the lethality due to failures to keep up with technology.<sup>38</sup>

In the end however, the Russian economy proved unable to support the war effort. The ever-increasing need for manpower led to conscription of farmers. Since Russia used grain to finance the war, this cut into the production of this essential commodity crop and the Czar was forced borrow to finance the war. As Russia did not possess a sophisticated financial network, runaway inflation and a near collapse of the economy occurred. In large part, the threat of financial collapse drove the Czar to sue for peace.<sup>39</sup>

Russian imbalance in its national institutions, a stratified society, relatively weak industrial base and an overconfident military led Russia to near disaster in an otherwise peripheral conflict. Russia overestimated its relationship with Austria and rather than gaining an ally was forced to deploy valuable troops and resources to counter Austria's threatened declaration of war. In the end Russian might was laid to rest and the European order would reorganize with Germany and Italy emerging as the new continental powers. Both would eventually challenge British international supremacy and contribute to its 20<sup>th</sup> century decline.

### **Lessons Learned and the Future Order**

While the history of the rise and fall of these great nations may seem obtuse at first glance, the lessons they provide are illuminating for the United States. All of these nations experienced decline after achieving positions of regional or global dominance. Generally their downfall can be attributed to a failure to recognize the changing nature of the international environment relevant to their period of supremacy. All

were victims of imbalance between the pillars of power and became overly dependent on their strengths refusing to acknowledge critical weaknesses. They failed to cognitively observe changes, restricted their strategic options and failed to recognize that the time to make critical changes was when they were at their apex of power.

The case of Great Britain is most relevant to America because the circumstances surrounding its ascendancy are most like the America experience. Great Britain had no peer rival in terms of economic, political, financial, social or military power in the mid 1800's. It based its strength on its economic advantage and both avoided and benefited from the crippling wars that plagued European competitors in the early nineteenth century. As the century progressed beyond 1815 with only short decisive wars it seduced itself into believing mutually exhausting wars were a thing of the past. Consequently, it allowed its army to languish into a state where it was inappropriately capable for the expanse of its domain. It failed to recognize this condition despite the clear warnings received during the Crimean War and lessons for all nations from the American Civil War. Instead Britain concentrated on improving its strengths; its economy and navy. As it concentrated on perfecting its strengths, other nations (most notably the United States and Germany) were closing the gap in these areas. Britain convinced itself this was inevitable and at the same time unimportant because it could more easily move on to the next level or area of prominence and thus continue to outpace the competition. This trend would continue, more or less unchanged, until WW II despite clear indications that Germany and the United States were emerging as peer competitors.

The tendency to concentrate on strengths or focus on past glories and thus ignore significant changes in the international order appears as a pattern among nations destined for decline. It reflects the essence of complexity theories and the considerations identified by those theories. Since the relative power (equilibrium) between nations is constantly changing within the international system (system change) the emergence of new technologies will cause certain nations to gain relative power at the expense of some other nation (system adaptation). This phenomenon is particularly important since the most opportune time to rectify strategic weaknesses is when a nation is at an apex of total power. Certainly no other time could be logically argued as more appropriate.

Kennedy argues that the dynamics for change are driven chiefly by economic and technical developments, which impact social, political, military and global positioning elements of a nation. He

points out that the speed of change is not uniform nor are the results. Further, periods of change operate at different speeds and intensities in various parts of the world at the same time. The uneven pace of economic change has crucial implications on military and strategic power of nations.<sup>40</sup>

Five broad trends will define the nature of the international environment in the next century. These trends, though seemingly obvious, reflect the changing nature of the international system relative to that of the Cold War period (which continues to define much of American security and foreign policies).

- The international system will continue to be dominated by the sovereign nation states. They will remain the dominant social institution.
- The rate of economic change will continue to accelerate with agriculture and raw material production losing value as industry gains value. However, knowledge based products will assume the leading position among industrial products.
- Growth between nations will be uneven. Current trends provide insight into the future of this trend. Russia will continue to decline while the US and Japan grow. The Pacific Rim will grow primarily as a function of its broad based economic structure. Asian growth trends include China.
- Arms production will be marked by the ever-increasing cost of weapons, as newer technologies are required to maintain effectiveness. This will drive the cost of arms to astronomical proportions.<sup>41</sup>

These trends paint a picture of a future international landscape where only nations with strong industrial and intellectual bases will possess sufficient wealth to acquire expensive weapons and thus will dominate global affairs. However, these weapons will be so expensive that they will generate a previously unheard of drain on the same national wealth and capital required to sustain the founding intellectual resources.<sup>42</sup> Further, the potential cost of losing expensive weapons in conflict will determine to a degree the level of commitment of “national treasure” nations will assume to maintain the conditions required for continued prosperity. A form of political-military paralysis could emerge leaving the lesser wealthy states in a position of “asymmetric” power to conduct war against more powerful states intent on preserving national treasure. This possibility increases the requirement for great nations to carefully evaluate the international system and diligently define foreign, defense and domestic policies to maintain balance between economic resources and instruments of national power.

## **Chapter Three**

### **Contemporary Sources and Instruments of National Power**

Paul Kennedy concludes national power emanates from wealth, a flourishing productive base, healthy financial systems and superior technology.<sup>43</sup> However, national power is only relevant when it is conveyed through instruments of power such as economic leverage, military force or diplomatic coercion. History demonstrates that nations must maintain balance between their instruments of national power in order to preserve broad options within the realm of international competition and conflict. This is particularly true during transitional and ambiguous periods. Between 1996 and 1999 The National Defense University's Strategic Assessment evaluated the instruments of US national power relative to global arena of the later 1990's. In 1996 it broadly defined contemporary instruments of national power as: Non-military, Political-military and War fighting Instruments. Further, it asserted the world order, though more "geo-strategically complex than during the Cold War," was stabilizing into three categories of nations: market democracies, transition states and troubled states.<sup>44</sup> In 1999 it revised that assertion concluding: the global environment was in a transitional state and no longer "progressing towards stability" but was rather "becoming murkier and more dangerous"<sup>45</sup> and "the future will demand careful blending of foreign, international economic and defense strategies" to ensure the success of US security policy<sup>46</sup>. This chapter briefly investigates contemporary instruments of national power available to achieve US security goals of prosperity, security and the spread of democracy are achieved.<sup>47</sup>

#### **Instruments of National Power**

The National Defense University categorizes instruments of national power into the three broad categories; Non-military Instruments, Political-military Instruments and War-fighting Instruments. Within this context the following areas will be examined: The non-military instrument of economics and intelligence; the political-military instruments of productive and technology bases, and defense engagement; and a selection of war fighting instruments necessary for military intervention.

##### **Non-military Instruments**

Of the non-military instruments identified in the 1996 Strategic Assessment, economics stands out as the most pervasive. Economic issues are now the central theme of political agendas across the globe. Of all the national instruments of power, globalization has most impacted economics. Unfortunately, as



economist Jeffery Sachs noted, fifteen years since the trend was first identified, globalization's exact economic implications are still not clearly understood.<sup>48</sup> The most invisible instrument of power is a nation's intelligence capabilities. It can also be the most perplexing for an adversarial nation. Open sources and capabilities provide known variables for adversaries to consider. Likewise, implied intelligence capabilities can raise doubt in the mind of an adversary. Regardless, the need for reliable information and insight into the capabilities and intentions of an adversary is more important than ever in today's globalized world.

### Economics

With economics dominating the international landscape it naturally becomes both an instrument of national power and potential weakness. The rise of economics reflects the relative decline of military power as the central post-Cold War instrument. Consequently, effective security policy is now measured by economics for two reasons. First, as tool for security policy leverage and second as a de-facto assessment of the success of the American security policy goal of ensuring prosperity and predictability. Yet, economics as an instrument of US security policy poses an ideological dilemma for US policy makers. On one hand economic success is considered the key to prosperity and peace. On the other hand, if economics constitute the predominant field of competition, the US must strive be victorious, thus intruding on the success and prosperity of some other nation.<sup>49</sup>

Economic instruments can be classified into three widely recognized categories; macro-economic policies, foreign aid and sanctions. The effectiveness of the US ability to apply economic pressure has been reduced by the relative decline in the weight of the US presence in the international economy. Complicating matters is the increasing connection between US economic and foreign policies.<sup>50</sup> The connectivity between human rights and Most Favored Nation status with China is the most conspicuous example of these new complexities. Lester Thurow points out the complex and conflicting dynamics of a globalized economy with his conclusion that "a global economy creates fundamental disconnects between national political institutions and their policies to control economic events and the international forces that have to be controlled."<sup>51</sup>

The goal of macro-economic policies during the Cold War was to entice third world nations into the Western Block and to simultaneously preserve Western Block cohesion. Since every nation that achieved

notable wealth since WW II (Japan, Europe, the Asian Dragons, etc.) at some point leveraged the US economy, the US was positioned to effectively employ macro-economic politics. However, purely national economies no longer exist and there is a new ideological construct that the role of governments is to create predictability not chaos. Regardless, the US market remains a critical requirement for third world and developing nations seeking increased prosperity.

The role of foreign aid is also changing. While used to entice governments into the Western camp during the Cold War, its emerging role is to address issues such as human rights and environmental responsibility. In 1994 private capital to developing nations exceeded government aid threefold. Japan has surpassed the US as the predominant distributor of foreign aid and the US government is now entering consortiums with private industry to leverage private foreign investment. Foreign aid, though undermined by lack of focus, limited resources and domestic debate, remains effective in promoting limited US economic agendas but has failed to cause political change in determined regimes.<sup>52</sup>

Sanctions are largely viewed as an alternative to war in international circles. However, their record of success is mixed. They are most effective at getting governments to change their position on soft policies or interests peripheral to their main political agenda. They are least effective at changing fundamental policies or toppling governments. Sanctions can often cause unexpected collateral damage against civilian populations, untargeted nations and the US economy.<sup>53</sup> While they are a popular action short of war they are also increasingly difficult to gain consensus on due to the international nature of the world economy.<sup>54</sup>

Economic instruments will continue to grow in importance as global integration continues. However, their effectiveness is not necessarily enhanced by globalization and the results of their future use will be astronomically more complex. Economic instruments are also inherently blunt. They must be used with conspicuous impact to get results and consequently tend to be more destructive than coercive. To control these effects, their use must be country and industry specific. Perhaps the most coercive economic tool the US possesses is controlling access to its lucrative domestic markets.<sup>55</sup>

#### Intelligence

Intelligence constitutes the second most effective non-military instrument of national power. The expanding nature of US intelligence efforts is reflected in the 1998 National Security Strategy:

“We place the highest priority on preserving and enhancing intelligence capabilities...Current intelligence priorities include states whose policies and actions are hostile to the United States;

countries or other entities that possess strategic nuclear forces or control nuclear weapons...terrorism, international crime, and drug trafficking...counter-intelligence including economic and industrial espionage and information warfare threats..."<sup>56</sup>

Unfortunately, US intelligence capabilities have suffered from declining budgets for some years and are estimated to be at seventy-five percent of 1989 levels.<sup>57</sup> This despite an increase in the areas of interest to the US and demands for more timely and accurate intelligence by national leadership.

Although clearly tied to military operations, intelligence operations (in the strictest sense) do not directly influence the behavior of foreign nations. They do however provide the critical information to make coercive and persuasive efforts by other agencies effective. Joint Pub 2.0 defines the role of intelligence as:

"The role intelligence plays in successful operations cannot be overstated. Intelligence provides insights concerning exploitable opportunities to defeat the adversary and helps JFCs clearly define the desired end state and determine when that end state has been achieved."<sup>58</sup>

Intelligence instruments fall into four categories: collection, analysis and reporting, counter-intelligence and covert action.<sup>59</sup> This paper will focus on the first three.

Collection efforts span the range from human reports to overhead satellite imagery. During the Cold War the US maintained a robust collection capability in all areas. However, budget cuts have forced greater reliance on automated means. This poses greater problems than just not having "eyes on target." For example, the keen sense knowledge developed by intelligence agencies during the Cold War of how communist systems worked is now contrasted with being able to understand the essence and motivations of political structures in chaotic and transitioning nations. Additionally, target countries are increasingly able to counter technology based collection systems by calculating overhead times for US satellites and encrypting communications.<sup>60</sup>

Analysis and reporting is the key to all intelligence operations. The nature of this process is changing as the US becomes more involved in UN and multi-national efforts. The need to share information is countered by an increasing dependence on foreign expertise. Additionally, the cooperation of private sector organizations, both commercial and voluntary, is increasingly important. The virtual avalanche of information now available to leadership puts additional strain on intelligence organizations. This of course introduces the possibility of intelligence interpretations guiding decision-makers. As William E. Burrows

commented in his book, Deep Black: Space Espionage and National Security:

“There is rarely disagreement over what a picture shows, for example, but what it means is often the subject of intense debate”<sup>61</sup>

The US is the primary intelligence target for many nations including some traditional allies. Porous international borders and market driven decisions are placing new pressures on US National Security policymakers to relax restrictions on technology releases. The steady expansion of computer networks communications systems and corporate and political intelligence stored in Internet systems has increased US vulnerabilities to exploitation.<sup>62</sup> Consequently, there has been a renewed emphasis on counter-intelligence. The National Counter-intelligence Center created by a 1993 Presidential Decision Directive maintains an extensive database on foreign intelligence activities and supports both FBI and CIA counter-intelligence efforts.<sup>63</sup>

US intelligence capabilities remain the worlds best. However, they face more challenging adversaries and are constrained by traditional scrutiny. Pressures will continue to downsize US intelligence capabilities as government budgets tighten. This is contrasted by an increasing need for intelligence capabilities beyond automated collectors. The fundamental challenge to US intelligence efforts will therefor be to prioritize efforts to meet the principal national interests. Defining these interests in a dynamic world and coming to terms with “Strategic Shocks” as a more limited intelligence capability “fails to detect all dangers in an ever-changing world” defines the future challenge.<sup>64</sup>

#### Political-military Instruments

Political military instruments are proving to be sources of tremendous power in an era where use of force and the “Clausewitzian” approach is increasingly controversial. They constitute the instruments most likely to fulfill the theories of Sun Tzu regarding “victory with out battle.”

“Whenever possible victory should be accomplished by diplomatic coercion, thwarting his plans and frustrating his strategy”<sup>65</sup>

B. H. Liddel Hart in his insightful book Strategy asserts the best strategy is to accomplish your goals (victory) without engaging in battle.<sup>66</sup> Both of these strategists recognize the ability of one nation to manipulate another through the conjecture of sheer might, diplomatic efforts or indirect pressure.

A nation’s most visible instruments of power are its productive base and defense engagement activities. The productive and technology base of a nation is clearly the engine that makes it run. While the

production and technology race constitutes is a competitive forum, defense engagement efforts constitute a team building forum. However, there is one other variable adversaries must consider; the implied technological capability of a nation. This implication can cause consternation for an adversary. This is reinforced when implied technological capabilities are suddenly unveiled; such as Sputnik and stealth.

#### Productive and Technology Bases

A nation's productive and technology base (P&T) is the essential engine of national power. It impacts not only a nation's ability to wage war but also its ability to peacefully influence events. The forces currently determining the strength of the US P&T base are the relationship between manufacturing and services, the rise of information technology and the effects of downsizing on the defense industrial base.

Manufacturing and services constitute the primary elements of a nation's P&T base (agriculture, mining and construction excluded). American employment trends have been steadily moving towards service industries since 1970. Fewer than sixteen percent of Americans are now involved in manufacturing.<sup>67</sup> Conventional reasoning would view this as a weakness in the nation's ability to pursue warfare. However, these worries are misplaced. The relevant question regarding manufacturing is not how many people are involved but rather what their per-capita productive output is and what are they manufacturing.<sup>68</sup> This is the lesson of nineteenth century Russia. Similarly, the rise of services is also a more complex issue. The kind of services and the products they provide is much more relevant. Finance, commerce, communications and education are all service industries. Dominating these fields in the international market is the key to effective service integration into a national power base.

New paradigms now mark the realm of P&T. Services control critical international functions. Long production lead times mean conflicts will be resolved with existing weapons inventories. The ability to produce leading edge technologies and rapidly apply them to weapons is more consequential. A major challenge for the US is streamlining its acquisition process so weapons can be fielded before their technology is obsolete. This efficiency is paramount in an age of rapidly changing technologies.

Information technology is now recognized as a strategic industry within the US P&T paragon. As such, it produces significant wealth beyond its own intrinsic value. As an industry that straddles the line between service and manufacturing it blurs the conventional arguments of importance the manufacturing over service segments increasing the importance of the service sector as an instrument of national power.

Current wisdom states that future wars will be “come as you are” affairs. Consequently, the primary role of the defense industrial base will be to replace lost resources not enter into WW II like long production runs. The need for long production runs will arise to replace current weapons as they approach obsolescence in the next fifteen to twenty years.

From 1985 to 1996 defense procurement shrank from \$136 billion to \$42 billion. This represents a move from 2.4 percent of GDP to 0.6 percent over the same period.<sup>69</sup> The defense industry has responded with streamlining, mergers and market diversification. Jon Alic noted in Beyond Spin-off that the sixty-seven prime contractors now secure ninety-one percent of their revenues from non-defense business.<sup>70</sup> However, certain defense industries are so unique that they have no commercial outlet and hence depend exclusively on the government for their survival. These include critical industries such as stealth, laser guidance and submarine construction. For these industries Washington must make clear and unequivocal commitments if it wants to maintain the technological lead.

The US P&T base is an important instrument of national power. The US continues to enjoy the dominant position in this field and consequently can exercise discretionary leverage if it desires. However, to maintain its relative lead the US must develop mechanisms to ensure the power of emerging technologies is harnessed to enhance security.<sup>71</sup>

#### Defense Engagement

Defense engagement embraces the long-standing political-military efforts to support US policy in peacetime. Historically, engagement has been viewed by the military as an unfocussed and resource-depleting effort, driven by congressional predilections, producing limited results. Despite this view, the National Security Strategy has come to emphasize it as a centerpiece of US security policy. The DoD is now challenged to provide a broader range of capabilities, particularly through peacetime engagement, to support the National Security Strategy’s goals of economic prosperity, security and growth of democracy.<sup>72</sup>

Defense engagement consists of Foreign Military Interaction (FMI) and Defense Diplomacy. This chapter limits discussion to elements of FMI such as Joint exercises and traditional CINC activities. Joint exercises foster interoperability between allies and potential partners. They compensate for reduced forward presence and create long term secondary effects such as building relations between junior officers.<sup>73</sup> Traditional CINC activities consist of programs specific to a CINC’s regional needs. The

common thread among these efforts is they are flexible, transparent and coordinated with the appropriate US diplomatic mission.

The Roles and Missions Report validated Defense Engagement as an inexpensive means to carry out US security policy. The Institute for National Security Studies has documented its positive effects on civilian and military leadership. However, in an era of reduced defense budgets it remains a controversial diversion of defense dollars away from conventional combat capability. Despite this controversy three Defense Engagement trends are emerging. First, there is a growing reliance on defense resources due to decreased foreign policy budgets. Second, DoD personnel shortages in critical areas such as FAO's, military policeman, and civil affairs specialist are creating CINC on CINC competition. Finally, defense contractors are assuming an increasing role and filling the void left by limited DoD resources by privately contracting with foreign nations to provide service-in-kind.<sup>74</sup>

#### Military Instruments

Military instruments of national power can be classified into three broad categories; unconventional, limited and classic military instruments. They can be employed interchangeably, sequentially or simultaneously to produce differing degrees of impact. However, regardless of approach, they must be employed in conjunction with other instruments of national power and their use must be considered irreversible. This paper will concentrate on the latter two instruments, as they are the focus of doctrinal change confronting the services.

#### Limited Military Intervention

Limited military intervention have been four times more likely to occur since 1990 than in the previous forty-year period since the end of WW II.<sup>75</sup> Limited operations differ from full-scale war in that they involve limited numbers of forces, are generally shorter in duration and paint of façade of being less intense. Politically, they differ significantly from other mechanisms in that they do not call for the UN or Congress to declare war. In other words they are more politically expedient.

Military deployments in support of diplomacy have become routine. One of the unfortunate results of routine use of diplomatic deployments is an increase in the threshold for effectiveness. Three emerging trends now enter into the calculus of adversaries confronting the US. First, the level of domestic political support US leadership can secure. Second, the ability of the US to validate its designs through Untied

Nation's consensus. And finally, the juncture of events that marks the actual first use of weapons or introduction of forces (particularly ground forces).

Deployments are not substitutes for diplomacy. However, they do serve to bolster diplomacy. Unfortunately, adversaries now openly challenge US resolve when deployments are undertaken. The escalation of thresholds to more commonly require the guarantee of ground forces is fundamentally altering the model for "diplomatic deployments." The use of ground forces increases risk, constrains diplomatic maneuvering and makes withdrawal more complex. However, diplomatic deployments are still effective if they are relevant, recognize the adversary's calculus and cross the thresholds he will respond to. US deployments to Kuwait in 1994 and 1998 met all three requirements and sent a clear signal to Baghdad.

Limited air strikes constitute the most prevalent use of military power in the "limited" construct of the last decade. The virtual assurance of air superiority, reduction of collateral damage by precision weapons, perception of reduced risk (or no risk with cruise missiles) and the semblance of "measurable results" make this option seductive to political leadership. However, like diplomatic deployments, the thresholds for effectiveness have notably increased. Correspondingly, the ability of air strikes alone to accomplish political goals has increased.<sup>76</sup> Air strikes are still instrumental in bringing adversaries to the negotiation table. However, to be effective they must be employed with other instruments such as embargoes or the use of ground forces (threatened or actual).<sup>77</sup>

The rise of conflict on the periphery of US interests sets the stage for continued limited responses. However, expectations often exceed capabilities and use in isolation from other instruments is increasingly ineffective. Finally, the threshold for effectiveness is steadily creeping upward. The use of ground forces is now the mark of US resolve and credibility. This change dramatically alters the nature of limited responses and increases the need for politicians and military leaders to either accept ambiguous and non-linear results or be willing to escalate beyond the scope of "casualty free" limited responses.

#### Classic Military Instruments

Historically a nation's military prowess has been the most quantifiable measure of its power. While this may remain true, changes in the global architecture have subordinated military might to economic and informational power. Nonetheless, military power remains the most visible and coercive instrument of national power and the United States will remain the principal military power in the world for the



foreseeable future.<sup>78</sup> Further, non-military instruments are often dependent upon the existence or perception of military might to be effective.

The US inventory of weapons of classic military power were conceived and acquired during the Cold War. Consequently, there exist a “disproportionate emphasis on those force components geared to high-end threats while insufficient weight [is] accorded to those designed for middle- and low-end threats.”<sup>79</sup> The need to “balance the books” is a popular political agenda. Inventories of air superiority fighters must be balanced against mounting needs for ground attack aircraft. Cruise missiles are increasingly more useful than attack submarines. However, the need to counter a “great power” threat cannot be totally discounted.

Classic instruments of military power can be categorized into three groups; land, aerospace and maritime forces. Each provides a unique capability to national leadership. Each is also dependent on at least one other component to be effective.

#### Land Forces

The US Army and Marine Corps comprise the US land force elements. This chapter limits discussion to the Army as it is the preponderant force. The Army has been shifting its war fighting emphasis from high intensity warfare against Soviet armored forces to winning two smaller, yet high intensity, major regional conflicts for many years. Its Force XXI report recognizes power projection and advances in technology as the pathway to future relevance. Within this context it has created a blueprint for increased rapid response, more lethality, advances in technology and increased interconnectivity of forces.<sup>80</sup>

Change has been too slow in coming and results have proven insufficient. The Army’s performance during the recent Kosovo campaign brought the issue to a head.<sup>81</sup> Consequently, the Army’s Chief of Staff recently announced plans to expedite change with increased emphasis on developing responsive forces.

“To adjust the condition of the Army to better meet the requirements of the next century...the Army will undergo a major transformation to accomplish the following...improve strategic responsiveness ...enable our divisions to dominate across the full spectrum of operations by providing them with the agility and versatility to transition from one point on that spectrum to another with the least loss of momentum...look for log support reductions...This commitment to change will require a comprehensive transformation of the Army.”<sup>82</sup>

While this effort reflects the political climate of the day, the fact remains that the Army has been largely successful in accomplishing the missions assigned to it. Further, the Army remains tied to a National Strategy requiring heavy forces capable of operating nearly simultaneously in two different theaters.

The US Army is capable of conducting high intensity warfare better than any other army in the world. Though smaller than at the close of Desert Storm, it is still larger than most and far more capable than potential adversaries. It provides the ability to halt or deter aggression through presence or the threat of presence. It can conduct offensive operations to reverse ill-gotten gains. Finally, it provides confidence to allied nations serving alongside the United States.

Recently however, the Army has provided vast numbers of resources for efforts other than high intensity warfare. Now categorized as "Small Scale Contingencies," (SSC) the Army has provided forces for limited intervention counter drug operations, and humanitarian operations. The 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review explicitly recognized SSC's as a military mission impacting force structure and requirements:

"In general, the United States, along with others in the international community, will seek to prevent and contain localized conflicts and crisis before they require a military response...Therefore, the US military must be prepared to conduct successfully multiple, concurrent smaller-scale contingency operations worldwide..."<sup>83</sup>

These long-term operations, referred to as "shaping" in contemporary idiom, have placed a great strain on Army resources and have caused debate within the Army on training and readiness.<sup>84</sup> However, it is important to note "shaping" has replaced the concept of "reassurance" and actively serves the US national interests by advancing US values and promoting regional stability.<sup>85</sup>

The Army faces great challenges in the emerging security environment. The task of organizing and equipping large combat formations for missions beyond deterrence and combat and back again is complex and requires resources and time. Further, forces transitioning between roles are generally unprepared for combat operations. The more the US commits land forces to these roles the more likely an adversary will see this as over-extension and enter it into his calculus as an opportunity to exploit US capabilities.<sup>86</sup>

#### Aerospace Forces

Air power, whether US Air Force or US Navy, provides the ability to respond quickly and lethally across the globe. Force projection from forward bases, CONUS or carriers complicates any adversaries measure of US response. Further, unmanned weapons such as cruise missiles frustrate his ability to leverage America's greatest malady, "casualty aversion." Aerospace forces also exploit the space environment to enhance US terrestrial capabilities, ensure US control of space and multiply terrestrial force effects.

The Cold War Air Force structure was designed to accomplish four missions: establish air superiority; suppress Warsaw Pact (WP) air defense systems; interdict WP war-making infrastructure and attack WP ground forces. With the exception of having to actively establish air superiority, some or all of these mission areas have been required every time air power has been used over the past decade. Air superiority, though not the central mission in recent conflicts, nonetheless remains absolutely mandatory to ensure the protection of High Value Assets and to ensure freedom of action by attack and ISR aircraft. Simply put, the capabilities designed during the Cold War are still sound. However, the contemporary problems for air power are aging fleets and the increasing ability of adversaries to counter US air power.

The experience of naval aviation has been similar. However, proliferation of anti-ship weapons has complicated the navy's challenges. These threats have forced fleets further from coastal areas and increased the importance of air superiority fighters and defensive ships to protect the carrier, and tanker aircraft extend the range of the air wing. With finite deck space and greater need for attack aircraft, this has generated a requirement for an inventory of more multi-role aircraft. However, Naval aviation is stretched to its limits and faces the problem of an aging aviation fleet and finite acquisition resources.

Air superiority has been all but conceded by recent adversaries. However, they have compensated by increasing the capabilities of their Integrated Air Defense Systems (IADS). This reflects economic realities and is a form of asymmetric defense since compared to building air forces, building IADS is much more affordable.

In the past few years it has become evident that sanctions, deployments and other limited response options are insufficient to coerce belligerent governments. Correspondingly, diplomatic efforts have commonly escalated to include air strikes. This has emphasized the need for more and better ground attack platforms, increased intelligence capabilities and improved munitions. The Air Force and Navy have responded to these requirements with increased investment in precision guided munitions, cruise missiles, new generations of multi-functional fighters and increased ISR capabilities. Interestingly, the use of air power has led to the re-emergence of bombers in conventional role after forty plus years of strategic-nuclear posturing (exclusive of Vietnam). The employment of bombers, carrying firepower to adversaries from the CONUS, poses a new dilemma for challengers measuring US capabilities by forward presence or counting carriers.

Despite its increased use, continued reductions in air power force structure seem inevitable. The cost of modern aircraft alone will drive further cuts. Mechanisms to offset this loss will be required if the US is to maintain its relative advantage. Increased emphasis on space capabilities offers a force multiplier to compensate for reductions. Communications, intelligence, surveillance and targeting are just some of the capabilities a robust space structure provides. Most important however, space assets provide a consistent and unobtrusive forward presence.<sup>87</sup> However, the multi-national and multi-corporate nature of the space industry means the US can neither assume it has sole access to space nor that it can limit an aggressor's access to space. Finally, while space is a force multiplier, it does not apply firepower to targets.

Air power will continue to be widely employed as an instrument of national power. It has risen to become perhaps the "choice of first resort" by national leadership desiring to send clear signals of American intent. Accordingly, nations hostile to the US have taken measures to counter American air power. Proliferation of IADS and sophisticated exploitation of the media have become the asymmetric defenses of today. The use of air power alone is normally insufficient to cause belligerents to alter their behavior. Consequently, leadership must be cautious in understanding what air power can do and build strategies and expectations around those realities.

#### Maritime Forces


American naval power is unmatched anywhere in the world. Its ability to operate in international waters unconstrained by diplomatic legalities defines its great strength. Mobility and self-sufficiency means naval power can be introduced or withdrawn with no reliance on host nation support. However, force reductions have hampered the Navy's ability to provide continual presence across the globe.

The Navy is refocusing its strengths from a Cold War mentality of controlling lines of communications to operating in the littoral areas of the world. Its newest doctrine, Forward From the Sea, emphasizes preventing regional conflict and operations to enable the employment of US air and land forces in follow on campaigns.<sup>88</sup>

This shift in emphasis reflects the lack of a credible threat to US shipping, unlikely possibility of force on force naval engagements and the need for naval forces to bring firepower to the battle ashore. However, as with air power, hostile nations are responding to shifts in naval doctrine with innovative and asymmetric threats. The use of mines, inexpensive anti-ship missiles, land based cruise missiles and diesel submarines

are some of the emerging naval threats. All have the ability to seriously slow naval operations, inflict sufficient damage and to alter the will of political leadership

While the Navy is moving towards a new force structure reflecting the increased need for littoral capabilities, it is a slow process. Warships constitute enormous investments and are normally built with life spans of 30 years or more. While the numbers of attack submarines and convoy escorts have been reduced and the number of mine sweepers increased, the navy cannot entirely discount the need to engage in force on force warfare or address the needs for “blue water” operations.



Changes in US Naval Force Structure <sup>89</sup>

The US certainly does not want to repeat the force structure lesson the United Kingdom learned in the Falklands campaign.<sup>90</sup> Consequently, it must find ways to enhance the capability of its remaining fleet strength. Increasing the numbers of Tomahawks at sea and the use of space capabilities are such methods. However, the biggest challenge facing the Navy is the ability to maintain peacetime overseas presence with a reduced fleet size. Forward basing with the Seventh Fleet in Japan and the Sixth in Italy help in this equation. However, the lead-time required to deploy a sizable force from CONUS drives the need to keep one third of the force continually deployed. A high operations tempo in turn accelerates fleet aging.<sup>91</sup>

### Observations on Instruments of National Power

In his essay, What to do with American Primacy, Richard N. Hass, Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings institute wrote:

“But amid this uncertainty (of the emerging world order) is the stark reality that the United States is the most powerful country in the world...It must be said at the outset that America’s economic and military advantages, while great, are neither unqualified nor permanent.”<sup>92</sup>

This statement, in discriminating eloquence, announces the status of America's instruments of national power. All of America's advantages could be quickly lost without careful husbanding, an insightful security strategy and continual maintenance of established advantages.

Calls for reduced resources for almost all instruments of national power as well as reorganization and reform of many security institutions mark the contemporary political dialogue for change. Acquiring new forms of power within this construct will mean rethinking conventional and historic solutions. The chemistry of how the US employs its array of instruments is certain to change. Some instruments, previously used sparingly will be used extensively. While others, employed successfully for years, will be discarded. These changes are healthy indicators of US policy adjusting to the uncertain complexity of an emerging world. However, to be truly effective changes cannot be made unilaterally among institutions.

The mission of the DoD will continue to increase. However, its relative influence will diminish in the face of expanding economic power.<sup>93</sup> As the private sector grows in previously state dominated societies and US commerce asserts greater global presence, the US government will increasingly have opportunities to make its presence felt through private channels. However, as "promising" as this may appear, the private sector cannot secure the defense of the United States. Consequently, the need for balance between private and state instrumentalities will remain paramount.

Continued engagement is the only reasonable course available to the US in a dynamic world. Ambiguity and uncertainty will cause the US to enter into affairs of peripheral interest with limited goals. National Security policymakers must realize the old paradigm of linear equations will not always be relevant in these endeavors. While withdrawal will certainly be seen as a sign of weakness and will have a much higher long term cost, engagement must be moderated against available resources.

The US will continue to be first among equals. Its inventory of instruments is impressive and it is actively striving to come to terms with a rapidly changing international environment. Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen captures the possibilities for the future in his 1999 Report to the President and Congress:

"As the 21st century approaches, the United States faces a dynamic and uncertain security environment. On the positive side of the ledger, the United States is in a period of strategic opportunity. The threat of global war has receded and the nations core values of representative democracy and market economics are embraced in many parts of the world, creating new opportunities to promote peace, prosperity, and enhanced cooperation among nations. U.S. companies are leading a dynamic global economy. Alliances such as NATO, the U.S.-Japan alliance, and the U.S.-Republic of Korea alliance, which have been and remain so critical to U.S. security, are adapting successfully to meet today's challenges and provide the foundation for a

more stable and prosperous world. Former adversaries, like Russia and other former members of the Warsaw Pact, now cooperate with the United States across a range of security issues. Many in the world see the United States as the security partner of choice.”<sup>94</sup>

Unfortunately, hopes for a New World order have not proven true. The US has gained many new enemies in the wake of the Cold War and is now seen by many nations as the “new rogue” state on the globe. Many nations strongly desire parity with the US and are actively pursuing programs to reach that goal. To counter those efforts the US must consider the relevance of its instruments of national power and apply them in a carefully considered and balanced strategic plan. If change is required, then the time to make change is now, from a position of strength, and within the construct of a well formulated strategic plan.

## **Chapter Four**

### **US National Security Policy**

American security strategy has historically been based on complimentary elements of foreign and defense policy. This model was most clearly epitomized during the era of “containment.” “Containment,” defined by its unambiguous goals and an easily understood framework, provided clear rules for all instruments of national power to focus on for almost fifty years. However, post Cold War globalism and a more ambiguous international world order have impacted the national security construct such that the importance of economic and technological policies are now equally significant and the rules of international security are much less lucid. To deal with a more dynamic and in many ways more demanding international environment, the US has designed an all encompassing National Security Strategy (NSS) based on the notion of “engagement.” This chapter briefly investigates the historical perspective of US security strategy, essential elements of the “engagement” strategy and the National Military Strategy (NMS) that supports it.

### **US Foreign Policy, a Historical Perspective**

Like all nations, the US security strategy is based in part on its historical perspectives. Henry Kissinger in his book, Diplomacy, contends two schools of thought have chronicled US foreign policy.<sup>95</sup> The first asserts America should perfect democracy at home and act as a beacon for the world. The second charges the US should play the role of “crusader,” actively advocating the spread of democracy and American values.<sup>96</sup> While these perspectives capture the dichotomy of the “isolationist” and the “missionary” notions they are also inextricably linked by the idea that American democracy is the best form of government and the world could enjoy peace and prosperity if it embraced the American way.

Since the end of WW II the US has crusaded as a “missionary” of democracy. This aspiration reflects the triumph of Woodrow Wilson’s view of foreign policy over that of Theodore Roosevelt. Roosevelt postulated that national interests should drive US foreign policy. Roosevelt’s view was in large part based on his perception that international relations was essentially a struggle in the “Darwinian” sense and asserted “only the strong would survive.”<sup>97</sup> Wilson on the other hand appealed to America’s sense of “righteousness” with his “exceptionalist” based approach, which recognized the romantic notion of



America as a beacon of hope with an obligation to take the “word of democracy” to the world.<sup>98</sup> Four tenets defined Wilson’s missionary ideology:

- America’s special mission transcends day-to-day diplomacy and obliges it to serve as beacon of liberty for the rest of mankind
- The foreign policies of democracies are morally superior because the people are inherently peace-loving
- Foreign policy should reflect the same moral standards as personal ethics
- The state has no right to claim a separate morality for itself<sup>99</sup>

“Engagement” which declares “promoting democracy abroad” as a fundamental objective, represents a continuation of the Wilsonian notion of US foreign policy.<sup>100</sup>

### **The Geo-strategic Environment**

Historically geo-strategic shifts and instability in the world order were marked by changes in the relations between the great powers. These shifts in turn drove changes in security strategies. The decline of the Soviet Union defines the most recent “shift.” Resultantly, global trade and security have displaced “containment” and as the keystones of US security strategy.<sup>101</sup> Recognizing stability underwrites their trade and security agendas, the great nations have demonstrated they will take diplomatic, economic or military action to ensure global stability is maintained.<sup>102</sup> Consequently, US Security strategy embraces the notion of “Engagement” to ensure stability through its three objectives: enhancing security, bolstering economic prosperity and promoting democracy abroad.<sup>103</sup>

To be effective the NSS must be based on assumptions regarding the future nature of challenges to US security. The NSS refines future threats into five categories: Regional or state-centered threats, Transnational threats, Spread of dangerous technologies, Foreign intelligence collection and Failed states.<sup>104</sup> The 1999 Strategic Assessment identifies eleven potential threats that could have destabilizing effects. These threats range from rogues, ethnic warfare, failed states, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, erosion of US military superiority, global economic collapse to disintegration of the Western Alliance system.<sup>105</sup> Recent events such as Kosovo, Bosnia and Rwanda indicate transitional and troubled states appear to constitute the most likely axis for future conflict and disruptive turmoil. Transitional states with their authoritarian governments and politicized economies may try to gain greater eminence through aggression. Troubled states, whose structures are marked by anarchy, genocide and religious and ethnic extremism, may implode or explode. Regardless of the reason, these occurrences introduce turbulence into the global arena and turbulence disturbs the predictable environment the great powers want to preserve.

The salient question is to what degree will the great nations be willing to risk national treasure to preserve predictability and stability? The US will continue to intervene in those areas of historic and strategic interest as well as areas where altruism prevails. However, globalism makes it harder to define areas of strategic interest to build policy upon. The commitment of other nations, both competitor and confederate, will also define the possibilities for coalition or conflict. Paul Kennedy captures the essence of the future requirement for US Security Policy with his assessment that it must “face three types of foreign policy problems: handling friends, handling foes and handling the rest.”<sup>106</sup> The NSS attempts to provide guidance to answer that question.

### **The US National Security Strategy**

The NSS states the goal of US security strategy is to “ensure the protection of our nation’s fundamental and enduring needs: protect the lives and safety of Americans, maintain the sovereignty of the United States with its values, institutions and territory intact, and promote prosperity and well-being of the nation and its people.” It recognizes the complexity and interconnectivity of international security, economics, environmental issues, crime and advancing mankind and promotes a Wilsonian based construct of “engagement” on broad-based, multiple and simultaneous planes. It establishes three levels of national interest: Vital (having overriding importance to the survival of the nation), Important (those which affect the nation’s well being and the character of the world) and humanitarian (those where American values demand a response). It also proposes three objectives to achieve its goal: enhancing security, bolstering economic prosperity and promoting democracy abroad. To accomplish its objectives the NSS designates four engagement activities: Shaping the international environment, responding to threats and crisis, promoting prosperity and promoting democracy. The role of the military varies amongst these activities from being the centerpiece to playing a secondary-supporting role. However, the military is impacted by and impacts every engagement activity across the spectrum of objectives.<sup>107</sup>

The NSS recognizes the military as an essential tool in the role of shaping the international environment. Shaping activities enhance US security by promoting stability and diminishing threats. Preventative diplomacy is considered the most preferable method to counter threats and avoid the requirement rebuilding failing nations. However, credible military force is required to give preventative diplomacy substance. Military activities such as overseas presence and peacetime engagement activities act to deter

aggression, promote regional stability and serve as a model for emerging democracies. Deterrence is based not only on US nuclear capabilities but also on a credible conventional force to underwrite declaratory policies. The reinforcement of US forces in the Gulf from 1997 to 1998 clearly illustrated the importance of military force in assuring security. Despite the success of US deterrence capabilities, a new range of terrorist and criminal threats is emerging which are not deterred by traditional deterrents. Deterring these threats mark one of the most difficult challenges facing the military. Finally, the NSS recognizes that military cooperation serves to build security with nations that are neither staunch allies nor known foes.<sup>108</sup>

Shaping efforts alone cannot guarantee international security. Consequently, military forces must be prepared to respond to a full range of threats and crisis. The NSS notes deterrence straddles the line between “shaping” and “responding” and is often the first stage in responding to crisis. The spectrum of threats demanding military preparedness has expanded beyond conventional thought. Terrorism, international crime, drug trafficking and managing the consequences of WMD incidents are all potential missions for military forces. Notably, Presidential Decision Directive 62 specifies military missions to address terrorism and WMD crisis management. Small-scale contingencies (SSC) represent the most prolific challenge for military forces. The NSS calls for military forces to be “trained, equipped and organized to be multi-mission capable.” to be able to “withdraw from contingency operations” and “deploy to a major theater war.” The NSS states “Fighting and winning major theater wars is the ultimate test of our Total Force.” Finally, the NSS calls for the military to fundamentally transform via the Revolution in Military Affairs to meet the challenges of the 21st century and simultaneously to preserve or improve critical capabilities such as Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, space capabilities, missile defense national emergency preparedness and overseas presence and power projection.<sup>109</sup>

Domestic prosperity is dependent on stability in key trading regions such as the Middle East, Asia, Latin America and Europe. Prosperity also demands US leadership in international development, financial and trade institutions. While prosperity is predominantly a diplomatic and economic effort, the military plays a notable supporting role through its shaping and response activities. It acts as the anchor to ensure trade routes remain open, energy resources are not threatened and markets are not closed through coercion or force. These roles are particularly important considering the global economy is expected to grow at three times the US economy, eighty-five percent of Persian Gulf petroleum exports go to US allies in Europe and

Japan and ninety-five percent of the world's consumers live outside the United States. However, enhancing American competitiveness in the global marketplace presents certain challenges for the military. This is most prevalent in the issue of dual use technologies and export controls where the NSS asserts the "US retains a monopoly over very few technologies" and must open export restrictions to provide US competitiveness in areas where technology is available from other sources. Finally, the NSS recognizes sustainable development in struggling nations improves the prospects for democracy, reduces the attraction of illicit commerce and drug trade and increases stability.<sup>110</sup>

The last activity the NSS specifies focuses on "promoting democracy and human rights." This activity is seen as essential because it emanates from the fundamental ethos of American society. However, it is also seen as pragmatic because "strengthened democratic institutions benefit the United States and World." The military's role in this effort is not specified in the NSS with the exception of alluding to the development of democratic civil-military relations in transitioning and troubled nations. However, the implications for military missions are intuitive. The NSS states the US will take actions to "alleviate human suffering, establish democratic regimes and promote reconciliation in states experiencing civil war or migration and refugee crisis." The ultimate goal of US democratization activities in this venue is to "broaden the community of free-market democracies and strengthen commitments to human rights and democratization." While these objectives clearly intimate military missions, the NSS does recognize the military "is not the best instrument for long term humanitarian concerns."<sup>111</sup>

### **National Military Strategy**

The 1997 National Military Strategy (NMS), "Shape, Respond, Prepare Now: A Military Strategy for a New Era," supported the 1997 NSS, "A National Security Strategy for a New Century." While the NMS is somewhat dated, the fundamental thrust of the NSS remains unchanged. Consequently, its relevant and insightful guidance continues as the cornerstone of military planning. It unequivocally states the primary mission of the US Armed forces is to "fight and win our nation's wars" and "defeat nearly simultaneous ...aggression in two distant theaters in overlapping time frames." However, it also recognizes "The US military will be called upon to respond to crisis across the full range of military operations, from humanitarian operations to ...conducting concurrent smaller-scale contingencies." It establishes two objectives for US military forces: "promote peace and stability" and "when necessary defeat adversaries."

To accomplish this it calls for capabilities to conduct three tasks: “shape the international environment, respond to the full spectrum of crisis, and prepare for an uncertain future.” It sets forth four strategic concepts for the success of military operations: strategic agility, overseas presence, power projection and decisive force. Finally, it highlights three core requirements to ensure the continued preeminence of US Armed Forces: “multi-mission capable, joint and interoperable.” It concludes the armed forces core competence, “the ability to apply decisive military power to deter or defeat acts of aggression.”<sup>112</sup>

Preventing conflict before it begins is the ultimate goal of US security policy. The NMS proposes the US military must be capable of: promoting stability through “peacetime engagement activities that promote regional stability, increase security of friends...mitigate or neutralize the causes of conflict” and deterring aggression through “demonstrated ability to defeat potential adversaries and deny them their strategic objectives.” It calls for military forces to respond to the full spectrum of crisis including SSC’s and humanitarian operations. It recognizes the future challenge to US interests will likely be a wide range of concurrent operations short of war. However, when the peacetime atmosphere deteriorates and more significant interests are at stake, US forces “must be able to respond to crisis from a posture of global engagement.” US forces should be prepared to respond to concurrent challenges in the Persian Gulf and Northeast Asia. To ensure this capability, the NMS cautions “careful consideration to ensure our forces are not dissipated and therefore either unable, or perceived as unable, to respond to more critical crisis.” Finally, it calls for a transformation of US combat capabilities through a “stabilized investment program in robust modernization and streamlining of support structures” to allow re-capitalization of the force.<sup>113</sup>

Strategic agility, overseas presence, power projection and decisive force constitute the strategic concepts of the strategy. Strategic agility requires US forces to operate at a speed and tempo adversaries cannot match and to be versatile enough to operate across a wide spectrum of missions simultaneously. Overseas presence provides forward-based forces capable of rapid response, an infrastructure to support mobilizing forces and visible proof of US commitment to its most vital interests. However, with fewer forces forward deployed the US has an increased need for power projection. The NSS calls for a US power projection capability that can deploy and sustain forces in and from multiple, dispersed locations and also fight its way into denied theaters. Decisive force demands the commitment of sufficient force to overwhelm all armed resistance or deter aggression through early and prompt deployment in force.<sup>114</sup>

The NMS outlines the core requirements to ensure the continued preeminence of US Armed Forces: “multi-mission capable, joint and interoperable.” To execute this strategy the US requires forces sufficiently sized and capable to defend the US homeland, maintain overseas presence, conduct wide ranging engagement activities and SSC’s, and conduct two near simultaneous major regional conflicts all in the face of WMD and asymmetric threats. To do this US armed forces must be proficient in core war fighting skills and yet able to jump to a multitude of other roles. This requires the correct mix of capabilities between services and within individual services. Joint Task Forces (JTF) are the model of future US military operations. They not only provide a broad range of capabilities but also confront adversaries with an overwhelming array of challenges. To be effective however, JTF’s require coherent joint operational concepts, doctrine and tactics at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. Finally, to ensure the success of JTF’s, US forces must be interoperable. This includes not just other services but also the ability to integrate with other civil and non-government agencies.

The NMS recognizes US military capabilities will deteriorate without proper maintenance. It notes that recruiting, training and maintaining a high quality force is the foundation of military readiness. This requires “adequate compensation...quality of life.” Readiness can only be maintained through sufficient funding, equipment, training and manpower levels to meet deployment requirements. US military forces must be able to operate as a joint, seamlessly integrated force. To do so will require greater exploitation of emerging technologies. Enhancements to strategic mobility, pre-positioned equipment and space systems will be required. Finally, the force structure recommended in the QDR and the NSS “are the minimum necessary to carry out this strategy at prudent military risk.”<sup>15</sup>

American security strategy continues to reflect the complimentary elements of foreign and defense policies. However, post Cold War globalism has raised the importance of economics and technology such that they now overshadow defense policies as the centerpiece of security strategy. The strategy of “engagement” addresses the more dynamic and demanding international environment confronting the US. Despite the larger role economics plays in national security, the NSS continues to depend on the defense policies to underwrite the security and stability, and further prosperity. The National Military Strategy, designed to promote stability and defeat adversaries, provides the institutional concept to build military capabilities to ensure a successful National Security Strategy.

## **Chapter Five**

### **The National Security Debate**

This chapter investigates the future path of US security strategy. The importance of the future direction of US security strategy to military planning and doctrine is a function of the long lead times required for weapons procurement, the re-engineering of force structure that often accompanies doctrinal change and the reality that defense budgets will continue to be problematic for the foreseeable future.<sup>116</sup> Three schools of thought appear to dominate the debate over the future of US security policy. They can be categorized as: dynamic engagement, selective engagement and disengagement.<sup>117</sup> This chapter investigates the fundamental argument of each school and highlights some significant implications of each for future military planning.

#### **Why the debate?**

The current national security strategy, founded on “Engagement,” reflects the Wilsonian view of security strategy. Kissinger notes that “as early as 1915 Wilson put forward the unprecedented doctrine that the security of America was inseparable from the security of all the rest of mankind. This implied that it was henceforth America’s duty to oppose aggression everywhere.”<sup>118</sup> A great deal of the domestic debate today surrounding US foreign policy focuses on the “Wilsonian” derived role of being the “world’s policeman.” As a consequence, American politicians, academics and strategist are increasingly discussing “Rooseveltian” national interests based concepts when defining foreign policy objectives.

Changes in the world order are challenging the validity of “Wilsonianism” and subsequently driving a response by American foreign policy pundits. One of the great questions facing security policy makers is how should the US define its national interests in today’s world? Samuel P. Huntington recently observed:

“Without a sure sense of national identity, Americans have become unable to define their national interests, and a result sub-national commercial interests and transnational and non-national ethnic interests have come to dominate foreign policy.”<sup>119</sup>

While security and prosperity remain the fundamental building blocks of US foreign policy, altruistic goals such humanitarian aid, the spread of democracy and opposing aggression are also considered national interests by the NSS. Although controversial, these may also constitute national interests since national interests inherently reflect the shared values of a democratic society. However, once identified, the society must be willing to dedicate resources to support these national interests. Classic instruments of national

power (military and economic) do not affect many of these new national interests. Therefore, in order for a US foreign policy based on "Wilsonian" ideals to be effective in today's world, the US must be willing to invest in both "hard" and "soft" power resources to operate across the three planes of contemporary global power; military, economic and transnational relations.<sup>120</sup>

National power, unilaterally applied on one plane or in one medium, is no longer effective. Soft power (television, cultural exchanges, the Internet, etc.) must be carefully balanced with hard power (military and economic power). Further, the desired effects of power must be carefully considered. It should hardly surprise foreign policy makers that applying hard power to achieve "democracy" in a transnational state uninterested in "democracy" constitutes a superfluous effort. By the same token, while "soft power" has gained tremendous significance due to the information age, it is also irrelevant to a "closed authoritarian society" where access is limited. To be effective the US must possess a balanced inventory of hard and soft power instruments. Finally, while "soft" power may be ascending relative to classic "hard" power, it has yet to prove capable of assuring the security of a nation.

The debate over the future of US security policy is driven in large part by political debate over the limits of "engagement," how it defines or achieves "national interests" and what level of "resourcing" is required to support US security policy. Further complicating matters, the US "engagement" policy is increasingly obligated by media stimulus and frustrated by the failure of diplomacy to achieve "quick" results. All of these factors have contributed to the debate over the nature of future US security policy.

### **Dynamic Engagement**

The current NSS epitomizes the school of dynamic engagement. It also constitutes the baseline against which most security policy debate is measured. It is characterized by a broad based and all encompassing approach to answer the many challenges to US security and prosperity. Joseph Nye, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs under the Clinton Administration, contends "the international economic system rests upon international political order" and one of the prime reasons for continued prosperity is "the presence of substantial US forces and American alliances."<sup>121</sup> The dynamic engagement school argues that national interests are "simply the set of shared priorities regarding relations with the rest of the world...broader than strategic interests...[they] can include values such as



human rights and democracy.”<sup>122</sup> Finally, it asserts that in a democratic society “the definition of national interests does not accept the distinction between a morality-based and interest-based foreign policy.”<sup>123</sup>

The dynamic engagement school embraces the notion that national interests should be defined in relation to national power. It asserts that power in the information age is dispersed along three distinct dimensions and polarities. Military power is uni-polar with the US dominating. Economic power is multi-polar and shared between the US, Japan and Europe. Finally, the last dimension, representing transnational relations that lie outside the borders of governments, is non-polar and widely dispersed among nations and non-state entities. The challenge for US security policy is to deal with the complexity of all three dimensions operating along differing polarities simultaneously.<sup>124</sup> To do this, the US requires a multitude of both hard and soft power instruments and must be actively engaged in events across the spectrum of dimensions to both ensure stability and prevent instability.

Four goals dominate the dynamic engagement school: “dampen security competition and reduce the risk of major war in Europe, Asia and the Middle East, largely by remaining militarily engaged in each of these regions; reduce the threat of weapon of mass destruction; foster a more open and productive world economy [seen as an important component of US economic prosperity]; and, build a world order compatible with basic American values by encouraging growth in democracy and by using military force against major human rights abuses.”<sup>125</sup> These connote numerous implications for military planners. This strategy rests on the belief that American forward military presence is still the most reliable deterrent against renewed great-power rivalries. It maintains the NATO is essential to European stability and encourages an expanded role for the alliance in the face of different threats to European security. However, it also recognizes the need to shift more responsibility to Europeans. In Asia, reaffirmation of the US-Japan security agreement, continued dedication to the sovereignty of South Korea, and a careful combination of engagement and active deterrence with China mark the dynamic schools strategy. While proliferation of WMD is still a significant threat, engagement with Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan have led to “de-nuclearization” of those nations. Halting the rise of North Korean “nuclearization” is perhaps the capstone of the strategy’s WMD efforts. The enforcement of human rights in Haiti, Somalia and Rwanda long with humanitarian and democratization efforts in Bosnia and Kosovo indicate dynamic utilization of military power to resolve crisis regardless of its ability to directly improve the underlying

causes of conflict.<sup>126</sup> All of these imply the continued need for a multi-functional, globally deployed military force.

### **Selective Engagement**

The school of “selective engagement” contends that although globalization and democratization explicate “dynamic engagement” they do not adequately define US national interests. Consequently, there is a need to revisit the fundamentals of US foreign policy and national interests. It contends geopolitical realities combined with the explosion of information technology leaves the US buttressed against more nations and entities than any other nation in the world. Globalization has benefited the US tremendously but has also left it vulnerable to a wider array of threats. As the US does not possess infinite security means, the selective engagement school advocates developing a mechanism to prioritize US global interests. Only then can it effectively allocate limited national security resources to balance its vulnerabilities.<sup>127</sup>

Failure to prioritize among levels of interest over the past few years has led to over-commitment of resources, credibility and instruments of national power to tertiary priorities. James Goodby and Kenneth Weisbrode, in their essay Back to the Basics: US foreign Policy for the Coming Decade, contend US foreign policy should be tied to three tiers of interest:

- Vital: protection of the US homeland and threats to the American people or way of life.
- Strategic: peace and stability in Europe and NE Asia and open access to Middle East oil.
- Lesser: stability in South Asia, Latin America and Africa and the spread of open markets favorable to US prosperity.<sup>128</sup>

They further assert the primary strategic interest of the US is unchanged despite changes to the world order: “to prevent a threat from a rival Eurasian state committed to territorial expansion.” This threat could manifest itself as a single dominating power, a confederation of medium powers or might emanate as a result of conflict among other nations competing for influence, resources or territory.<sup>129</sup>

Ashton Carter refines the concept of prioritized interests with his “A,B,C list”. He proposes a prioritized system of national interests that should define the defense planning strategy. Carter asserts US priorities should recognize three levels of threat:

- “A” list: those threats to US survival, way of life or position in the world. These are Cold War scale problems. He recognizes there are no current threats of this magnitude. Therefore this category is based on “what might be.”
- “B” list: actual threats to US interests. Deterable through ready forces. These are major theater war scale problems.
- “C” list: important problems that do not threaten vital US interests. Kosovo, Bosnia, Somalia qualify.

Carter recognizes threats can migrate across the list. For example, North Korea with nuclear tipped ballistic missiles would move from the "B" list to the "A" list as would a determined terrorist organization with access to WMD and the means to deliver them within the United States. He recognizes different tools are required to address the different lists. However, the "A" list should dominate defense planning and strategy.<sup>130</sup>

Robert Chase, Emily Hill and Paul Kennedy in The Pivotal States, assert that US security policy should focus on a select number of nations with the potential to substantially alter the future geo-political landscape. These nations include among others: India, Brazil and Mexico. They advocate a "strategy of selectivity and setting priorities regarding the developing world."<sup>131</sup>

Carter asserts two approaches are required to address "A" list threats. One to prevent them from developing into Cold War scale threats. The other to deal with them should prevention fail. This "preventative defense" would entail employing all sources of US national power to forestall dangerous trends before they require a military response. Preventative measures range from policies to influence the strategic direction of Chinese military to the Nun-Lugar Program to prevent Russian "loose-nukes" to intelligence innovations to detect "catastrophic terrorism." This concept is reflected in US strategies to "shape" the international environment. Unfortunately, calls to "respond" to "C" list threats have taken priority over efforts to "shape" "A" list threats. This in turn has depleted many of the resources required for "A" and "B" list preventative defense or have caused the military branches to focus their efforts on redefining themselves against a "C" list backdrop.<sup>132</sup>

Despite these realities and recent comments by the Joint Chiefs of Staff conceding US military capabilities are overextended. "Wilsonian" based altruistic foreign policy continues to pervade the US security construct. President Clinton recently commented:

"[W]hether you live in Africa or Central Europe or any other place, if somebody comes after innocent civilians and tries to kill them en masse because of their race, their ethnic background or their religion, and it is within our power to stop it, we will stop it."<sup>133</sup>

Open-ended commitments of this nature will continue to deplete limited US security resources and cause defense planners to strategize around "lesser" threats.

The selective school argues these indicators signal the time has arrived to recognize a fundamental change in security planning is required. In 1947 George Marshall warned against the problem of an imprecise security construct during another era when the US dominated world affairs:

“Now that an immediate peril is not plainly visible, there is a natural tendency to relax and return to business as usual...But I feel we are seriously failing in our attitude towards the international problems whose solution will largely determine our future.”<sup>134</sup>

A reassessment of US security policy does not mean the US is abandoning the fundamental ideology that has buoyed its greatness over the last fifty years. However, it does recognize that the while the US is the sole remaining superpower, it lacks the resources to “militarily dominate” the world order and still maintain a balanced array of national instruments of power. Consequently, it must develop some form of control mechanism to determine how it will allocate finite security resources and instruments of power in an international environment marked by complexity.

While the implications of this school for military planners appear to indicate a reduction in obligations, in reality they do not vary significantly from the dynamic engagement school. Military planners would still have to engage developing nations “to prevent them from developing into Cold War scale threats,” to prepare for rapid response to threats to the survival of the United States, posture for crisis threatening second order US interests and maintain capabilities for humanitarian operations. However, this strategy does provides a tool that prioritizes the employment US military force against armed conflict and a doctrinal focus on war fighting skills. On the other hand, it does not relieve the military of the need to maintain a broad spectrum of capabilities. The military will still have to maintain deterrent forces (both nuclear and conventional), a power projection capability to respond to “A” list crisis and a decisive force structure win an “A” list conflict along with a long list of “dual role” (humanitarian and military) capabilities to support and sustain forces in conflict. What military planners can possibly discount is the need to plan and structure for peripheral military missions such as enforcing environmental agendas or extended democratization efforts.

### **Disengagement**

The “school of disengagement” constitutes the third view of future foreign policy and offers the greatest divergence from current security and military planning. It continues to assert that the armed forces must be

able to provide for the peace and security of the nation and that the US must remain economically engaged with the world but rejects the notion of dynamic engagement with military power. It basis its assertion on a significantly more benign geo-political landscape than either the dynamic or selective schools of thought. Finally, it argues that the US can best achieve national security goals by “restraining American power...Rather than lead new crusades...address imperfections in its own society.” Disengagement is in fact a form of “modern day isolationism” but without traditional economic protectionism.<sup>135</sup>

Disengagement argues that the interests of the US remained unchanged despite the collapse of the Soviet Union; peace and prosperity. It also recognizes the US has two prime tools to ensure security interests: military and economic power. However, it does not consider all foreign relation’s issues to be security interests (for example, environmental issues do not generally threaten the security of the US and are therefore not security interests). It asserts US interests need to be separated into distinct categories such as security, prosperity, democratization, etc. Further, it contends military solutions to most security challenges are ineffective, too costly and often counterproductive.<sup>136</sup>

According to the disengagement school, the “physical security of the US (territory and freedom from coercion) is not threatened.”<sup>137</sup> It argues there has been a tremendous shift in the geo-political landscape from military to economic power such that continued investment in a large military force threatens the long-term competitiveness of the US and consequently its long-term security.<sup>138</sup> The US spends thirty-five percent of the total world defense expenditures, seven of the top ten other spenders are US allies and the closest rival spends on one-third of the US outlay. The defense budget continues to remain within the relative norm of Cold War spending levels while there is no indication of a peer rival, instability among the great nations or a threat to regional stability in Europe or Asia. It does however, recognize the economic importance and fragility of the Middle East and accepts there is a valid need for posturing in this region.<sup>139</sup>

Perhaps the most striking feature of the disengagement school is the extent to which it advocates reductions in military force structure and budgets. In Asia the minimum disengagement argument is to withdraw from Japan, rewrite its constitution and hand over Japanese defense to the Japanese.<sup>140</sup> The maximized Asian argument calls for total withdrawal from Japan and Korea, and demobilization of the 100,000 troops currently assigned and recognition of the strategic and operational difficulties China faces regarding domination of either Japan or Taiwan.<sup>141</sup> The maximized European argument calls for total

withdrawal from NATO (POMCUS would remain in theater), disbanding the US alliance with NATO, demobilizing 100,000 troops currently in Europe and providing a temporary nuclear umbrella for Germany as it gains its own nuclear capability to balance it against Russia, France and Britain. The school argues that in both Asia and Europe, the potential threats (North Korea, China and Russia) are incapable of competing with the technology, wealth or quality of the democratized market economy nations. Further, the threat of nuclear escalation (even as a last shot against a winning nation) makes territorial grabs between nuclear states too costly.<sup>142</sup> However, it recognizes the Middle East differs because Persian Gulf oil is absolutely vital to the global economy and the small populations of most oil producing states makes them incapable of providing their own robust defense. Therefore, the US should posture to ensure the freedom of the Gulf States, particularly Saudi Arabia which is seen as the linchpin oil producer. It does call for a substantial withdrawal of US forces forward deployed to the Middle East (excluding a small air capability to halt Iraqi aggression) and a "strike first, no quarter given" strategy towards any future Iraqi aggression. Finally, it concludes the defense budget could be halved and still provide adequate security.<sup>143</sup>

The implications of the disengagement school for military planners are dramatic. The military would restructure with 200,000 fewer forces, less than half its current budget, significantly reduced forward presence and a focus on one MRC. However, it would also be obligated to fewer responsibilities, could potentially focus on producing a high quality, high intensity force and would be more vigorously supported by, and integrated with, allies during crisis.

The three schools provide insight into the future of US security strategy and defense planning. All three advocate common elements that provide a baseline for military planners. All call for a defense structure capable of guaranteeing the security and prosperity of the US. All primarily define security and prosperity in terms of freedom from international coercion and continued economic growth. All dictate a robust nuclear deterrent force, the ability to respond to terrorism, power projection with modern technologically superior forces and protection of the Middle East oil supply. Two call for continued maintenance of a robust conventional force capable of conducting two nearly simultaneous MRC's and a broad range of other "lesser missions." Where they differ is in their assessment of the nature of the threat to US security and the degree to which US military forces should be employed to counter peripheral challenges and the relative weight given to allied burden sharing.

## **Chapter Six**

### **The Emerging Service Doctrines**

Confronted with the realities of dynamic globalism, the US armed services have initiated a series of strategies designed to both prepare for the future and mitigate current operational turbulence. The continued significance of the military in security matters substantiates their importance; J. Mohan Malik, Deakin University (Victoria, Australia), states “the use or potential use of military force remains the primary determinant of national security of all but the smallest nations.”<sup>144</sup> The new doctrines also signal a response to the increased utilization of US military to secure US security goals since the end of the Cold War. The axial defense doctrine, Joint Vision-2010 (JV-2010) combined with the service doctrines Forward from the Sea, Army Vision 2010 and Global Engagement: A Vision for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century Air Force represent the efforts of the services to address these demands. This chapter looks at JV-2010 and investigates the central thrust of each service doctrine.

#### **Joint Vision-2010 and “Engagement”**

JV-2010 is the baseline concept for defense planning over the mid-term. It constitutes the hub of all other defense doctrine initiatives and is critical to the overarching US security construct.

“Joint Vision 2010 provides an operationally based template for the evolution of the Armed Forces for a challenging and uncertain future. It must become a benchmark for Service and Unified Command visions...this template provides a common direction for our Services in developing their unique capabilities within a joint framework of doctrine and programs as they prepare to meet an uncertain and challenging future.”<sup>145</sup>

Based on four operational concepts: dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full-dimensional protection, and focused logistics, JV-2010 proposes greater combat capabilities can be achieved within the confines of reduced force structure and limited budgets by exploiting emerging technologies:

“America’s Armed Forces are smaller than in over 40 years...Faced with flat budgets and increasingly more costly readiness and modernization...Commanders will be expected to reduce the costs and adverse effects of military operations, from environmental disruption in training to collateral damage in combat...We will further strengthen our military capabilities by taking advantage of improved technology...to prepare our forces for the 21st century.”<sup>146</sup>

It also recognizes the need to respond to a multitude of military requirements across a broad spectrum of mission areas including those noted in both the dynamic and selective schools and it simultaneously urges

the services to develop capabilities with greater responsiveness to meet these challenges.

“[T]hese four new concepts will enable us to dominate the full range of military operations from humanitarian assistance, through peace operations, up to and into the highest intensity conflict...All organizations must become more responsive to contingencies, with less “startup” time between deployment and employment.”<sup>147</sup>

It concludes however by recognizing the fundamental purpose of the US military remains unchanged:

“The primary task of the Armed Forces will remain to deter conflict—but, should deterrence fail, to fight and win our nation’s wars.”<sup>148</sup>

This conclusion, specifically defining the “prime” role of US military forces, is congruent with the common characteristic of the current security strategy, the service strategies and all three schools of security policy.

Beyond this juncture however, the difficulties of achieving JV-2010 and simultaneously meeting the demands of engagement surfaces. In May 1997 the Concept for Future Joint Operations (CFJO) was published. It provided a more detailed foundation for “achieving the right capabilities to meet the challenges the US military will face in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.”<sup>149</sup> JV-2010 and the CFJO both focussed on high-end technologies designed to meet first and near first world threats. Unfortunately, 1990’s budget levels and operational commitments have left JV-2010 and CFJO essentially unfulfilled. House Armed Services Committee Chairman, Floyd D. Spence, commented in his recent report on the 2001 Defense Budget:

“[T]he bad news with regard to the President’s budget is that serious mismatches between strategy, forces and resources are not getting any better...widespread shortfalls have left a legacy of...readiness and modernization problems...over the past eight years, the Administration’s cumulative defense budget requests have fallen more than 300 billion dollars short of even covering the cost of inflation...there is no end in sight to this level of short term, operationally-related shortfalls in the years ahead”<sup>150</sup>

While JV-2010 envisions keeping the enemy at “arms length” with high technology, this has also been difficult to achieve. Increasingly US forces have relied on low-tech “boots on the ground” solutions to ultimately achieve policy goals. The Secretary of the Army, Louis Caldera, reported in his 1998 Report to the Secretary of Defense that “the Army had provided 60 percent of the people who had participated in 32 of the 39 major military operations since 1989 and more than 28,000 soldiers were deployed away from their home stations to more than 70 countries around the world on any average day in FY 1998.”<sup>151</sup>

The drain on resources and force structure driven by “engagement,” compounded with the recognition that greater “force efficiency” must be achieved has led the services to respond with new doctrines. In this effort the services are attempting to honor the intent of JV-2010 and simultaneously meet to the challenges



of “engagement.” However, these efforts are challenged by debate over doctrinal focus, the continuing demands of engagement and the still evolving vision of future security doctrine.

### **Forward from the Sea**

The Navy’s doctrine Forward from the Sea and supporting operational concept Network-Centric Warfare provide insight into the Navy’s operational vision. This doctrine evolved from a 1992 the Navy White Paper, From the Sea, which defined the strategic concept to carry the Navy beyond the Cold War and into the twenty-first century as “a change in focus and, therefore, in priorities for the Naval Service toward power projection and the employment of naval forces from the sea to influence events in the littoral regions of the world.” The doctrine addresses the unique contributions of naval expeditionary forces in peacetime operations, in responding to crises, and in regional conflicts.<sup>152</sup>

Forward from the Sea identifies five fundamental naval roles: projection of power from sea to land, sea control and maritime supremacy, strategic deterrence, strategic sea-lift, and forward naval presence. It acknowledges a continuing peacetime role, presents a mission focus and required force disposition:

“[T]he most important role of naval forces in situations short of war is to be *engaged* in forward areas, with the objectives of *preventing* conflicts and *controlling* crises...[C]hief among which is aggression by regional powers—and the necessity for our military forces to be able to rapidly project decisive military power to protect vital U.S. interests and defend friends and allies... In defining our national strategy for responding to these new dangers, the review emphasized the importance of maintaining forward-deployed naval forces...”<sup>153</sup>

It also identifies the essential elements of naval power as:

“*Aircraft Carrier Battle Groups* — with versatile, multipurpose, naval tactical aviation wings — and *Amphibious Ready Groups* — with special operations-capable Marine Expeditionary Units.”<sup>154</sup>

Finally, it identifies the future trends of naval power as “remaining focused on our ability to project power from the sea in the critical littoral regions of the world and structuring naval expeditionary forces so that they are inherently shaped for joint operations and tailored for national needs.” However it also cautions against radical force restructuring: “[W]e need to proceed cautiously so as not to jeopardize our readiness for the full spectrum of missions and functions for which we are responsible.”<sup>155</sup>

The Secretary of the Navy has expressed his concerns over the impact of “engagement’s” high demands on the US Navy in his 1999 Report to the Secretary of Defense:

“The Navy-marine Corps team responded to national tasking, at least once every three weeks during 1998. This is a five-fold increase from that experienced during the Cold War...high

operating tempo affected personnel retention...enlisted retention (is) about 6 percent below what is required to support a steady state navy force..."<sup>156</sup>

His report also indicated the impact of reduced budget levels, the demands of "engagement," and the future of US Navy modernization programs needed to meet the requirements of JV-2010:

"The most pressing long-term challenges to the Department are declining readiness of non-deployed forces and an inability to fund modernization initiatives...Naval forces maintained a high level of readiness during this increase in operations by shifting resources from re-capitalization and modernization accounts to support current operations."<sup>157</sup>

Navy leadership is clearly attempting to meet the goals of JV-2010 within the constraints of reduced budgets, high operations tempo and ambiguous planning guidance. However, the net result of their efforts has been to sustain classic naval capabilities with limited movement towards the more lofty concepts espoused in JV-2010 and the CFJO. Despite these shortfalls the Navy has been able to meet the demands ongoing contingencies. Unfortunately, the unpaid bill rests in modernization programs such as the CVNX-1, CVNX-2, DD-21 (land attack destroyer) and the Joint Strike Fighter among others.

### **Army Vision 2010**

The Army's doctrine, Army Vision 2010, recognizes the Army's role as the land component of a joint force and highlights the land-centric view of warfare. It defines the Army's role in Joint warfare and provides a vision of future capabilities:

"[Army Vision 2010] is the conceptual template for how the *United States Army* will...leverage technological opportunities to achieve new levels of effectiveness as the *land component member of the joint war fighting team*...[It] focuses on...the fundamental competency the Army contributes to joint operations—the *ability to conduct prompt and sustained operations on land throughout the entire spectrum of crisis*. It identifies the operational imperatives and enabling technologies needed for the Army to fulfill its role in achieving *full spectrum dominance*."<sup>158</sup>

It defines three missions for the Army: "to fight and win the nation's wars, to Provide a Range of Military Options Short of War –Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) and to Deter Aggression."

However, it also identifies the unique contribution the Army makes to the full spectrum of operations as:

"[The] power to exercise direct, continuing, and comprehensive control over land, its resources, and its peoples. It is this direct, continuing, and comprehensive control over land, resources, and people that allows land power to make permanent the otherwise transitory advantages achieved by air and naval forces."<sup>159</sup>

Finally, it defines five competencies required to ensure the Army's preeminence: "project the force, protect the force, shape the battle-space, decisive operations, sustain the force, and gain information dominance."<sup>160</sup>

The doctrine highlights four reasons why the Army will remain the “force of decision” for the US:

“First, most future operations will occur on the lower and middle portions of the continuum of military operations...where land forces provide unique and essential capabilities, the most options, and the most useful tools. These types of operations require...soldiers on the ground, directly interfacing with the civilians and/or military involved in the crisis.”

“[S]econd,...their direct relevance to the National Military Strategy’s strategic enablers: overseas presence and power projection...they provide the most visible, sustained foreign presence...[and] provide the most flexible and versatile capabilities for meeting CINC force requirements, from humanitarian assistance to combat operations...”

“Third, land forces are important to the US’s international credibility. The recent past provides a convincing example in the NATO deployment to Bosnia... the NATO peace plan ultimately required a large, visible contingent of US ground troops.”

“Fourth, U.S. land forces are most suitable for supporting the military’s contribution to peacetime engagement and interaction with foreign military forces. The overwhelming majority of military forces throughout the world are predominantly armies. Few countries have the need or resources to maintain significant air or naval forces. Military engagement in these countries normally means army-to-army contact.”<sup>161</sup>

It also notes that the Army faces a diverse range of operational challenges to meet the demands of warfare in the Middle East, Asia or Europe. It defines the operational requirements of these regions in seven mission areas: Defending or Liberating Territory, Punitive Intrusion, Conflict Containment, Leverage, Reassurance, Core Security, and Humanitarian.<sup>162</sup>

The Army is heavily committed and challenged to meet the goals of its new doctrine. General Eric Shinseki, Chief of Staff of the Army, recently commented to Congress on the impact of “engagement:”

“We can execute a two major theater war scenario. The first MTW would be moderate risk. The second one, risk would be in the high category with risk measured in the amount of time it would take us to bring that second MTW to conclusion.”<sup>163</sup>

“While we are trained and ready today, there is still a mismatch between the resources we have and the requirements we may face”<sup>164</sup>

Confronted with additional pressure to make the Army more “relevant” in the era of “engagement,” General Shinseki has embarked on a new initiative to create a lighter more responsive force nominally referred to as the “interim brigade.” This effort envisions fielding a new series of high survivability, lightweight weapons systems capable of “fighting on arrival.” This concept constitutes recognition of the Army’s need to more quickly align with JV-2010 initiatives.<sup>165</sup> However, it is also a response to Congressional criticism of the Army’s inability to rapidly respond to recent “C” list contingencies.<sup>166</sup>

### **Global Engagement: A Vision for the 21st Century Air Force**

The new Air Force doctrine, Global Engagement: A Vision for the 21st Century Air Force, differs from that of the Army and Navy in that it presents a vision less focussed on geographical control and more focussed on the relevance of time and technology. It also emphasizes the importance of CONUS based military power and the increasing importance of space based operations:

“Air Force leaders understood that their new strategic vision must meet the national security needs of the nation, and a national military strategy that has as its focus an increasingly US-based contingency force.”<sup>167</sup>

“Fundamental US national security objectives will remain largely as they have been for the past 220 years: to ensure our survival as a nation, secure the lives and property of our citizens, and protect our vital national interests... We are now transitioning from an *air* force into an *air and space* force on an evolutionary path to a *space and air* force.”<sup>168</sup>

The doctrine defines the Air Force mission as ensuring the security and prosperity of the nation by “[Defending] the United States through control and exploitation of air and space.” It establishes five core competencies as its central thrust: air and space superiority, global attack, rapid global mobility, precision engagement, information superiority and agile combat support.<sup>169</sup>

The Air Force is also finding it difficult to fund the modernization programs called for in JV-2010. To meet the demands of JV-2010 and its new doctrine the Air Force calls for higher investment in emerging technologies (especially space-based) and institutes mechanisms to seek out innovation and validate new concepts through an extensive system of “battle labs.” It also specifically calls for reductions in base structure, outsourcing and privatization, greater emphasis on RMA and increased civilizational of non-combat mission areas to free up funding for modernization.

The dynamics of engagement have led the Air Force to fundamentally alter the way it manages its force structure. To meet increased demands for air power, the Air Force has adopted an operational concept known as the “Expeditionary Air Force” (EAF). The Secretary of the Air Force in his 1999 Report to the Secretary of Defense indicated the impact of “engagement” on the Air Force noting that the USAF operated in 1998 at “four times its Cold War pace with 30 percent fewer people and 40 percent less force structure.”

“Today’s national security environment requires America’s Air Force to continuously conduct short-notice operations across the spectrum of conflict...”<sup>170</sup>

He further states the USAF is indeed doing “significantly more with significantly less.”<sup>171</sup> His report continued by defining the EAF concept as a reaction to the negative trends generated by the demands of “engagement” and cautioning against continued deferment of modernization programs.<sup>172</sup>

### **Conclusions**

There is universal agreement among the NSS, NMS, JV-2010 and the emerging service doctrines that the armed services exist to “fight and win the nations wars.” The services have each taken stock of their existing capabilities and projected them against the predicted future geopolitical backdrop to determine what capabilities they will need in the future. All agree there will be an increased need for technological solutions to existing problems, an increased demand for power projection and continued modernization of aging equipment. There is divergence in the degree to which each is posturing to support humanitarian and democratization efforts. However, this is in part driven by the natural capabilities of the services. All acknowledge the need to continued emphasis on Joint operations to ensure military success. Finally, the demands of engagement are presenting the services with a dilemma in terms of achieving the goals of JV-2010 and meeting existing operational demands.

## **Chapter Seven**

### **Assessments and Conclusions**

The evolution of American security doctrine is not over. The complexity globalization has wrought on the world order and the many variables it has introduced are not yet fully understood. Consequently, new schools of security policy are emerging as well as new defense doctrines. While international complexity is not a new phenomenon, globalization has made it increasingly more relevant to policy-makers. The challenge facing future foreign policy and defense decision-makers is to limit the errors derived from failing to understand complex systems, assumptions and the spectrum of possible solutions to security challenges. In an effort to recognize dynamics of these variables on policy making, this chapter contrasts and compares the various service doctrines against the emerging security doctrines to determine their relevance and compatibility with each other. It closes with conclusions on the future of US security policy and the ability of the US armed services to adapt to doctrinal change in a dynamic and complex security environment.

### **Emerging Doctrines and the “Dynamic School of Security Policy”**

The “Dynamic School” defines a vibrant and universal US global presence as the best way to ensure a stable international political order and economic system its central thrust. It calls for the services to provide: forward presence; a full spectrum capabilities to meet two MRC’s and multiple SSC’s along with numerous peripheral missions including environmental, criminal and humanitarian operations; a nuclear deterrent force, and to continue with force modernization with emerging technologies. It denotes four goals these capabilities should be designed to meet: reduce the risk of war through military engagement; foster a more productive global economy; reduce the threat of WMD and encourage democratization and use military force to counter human rights abuses. The ability of each service to fulfill these requirements defines its germaneness to the schools doctrine and consequently the relevance of their relationship.

Forward From the Sea provides the Navy with the fundamental tools to meet most of the demands of the dynamic school. Focussed on forward engagement to prevent conflict, continued emphasis of forward basing, and regional conflict it essentially aligns with the design of ensuring stable international political order through engagement. It continues to emphasize a continued nuclear capability as a deterrent force. It postures USMC capabilities along with sea power to combat human rights violations but lacks the ability to

provide the long-term overland presence often required for democratization. The ability to answer to peripheral missions is also acknowledged. However, long term sustainability and modernization are problematic and probably unachievable without increased funding or reduced commitments.

Army Vision 2010 clearly recognizes the broad range of capabilities the Army requires to meet the demands of the dynamic school. It emphasizes forward presence, active engagement with other land forces and the full spectrum of operations from warfare to humanitarian operations. However, while the emphasis of six of its seven operational requirements on war fighting skills fulfills its deterrence role, the remaining area, humanitarian, is probably under-emphasized relative to the importance of the Army's role as the "force of decision" in democratization and humanitarian operations. Power projection is a recognized a problem and is being addressed with the "Interim Brigade" concept. Modernization and provisioning the "Interim Brigade," is unachievable at current funding levels. Finally, the ability to answer two MRC's is considered high risk and only ameliorated with further investment in power projection and technology.

Global Engagement answers the schools demands for a rapidly deployable force to answer the demands of "enforced humanitarian rights," to deter war and to counter WMD. It places great emphasis on force modernization and increased use of technology to ensure security. However, it does not emphasize forward presence and places most of its doctrinal emphasis on war fighting skill (global mobility being the exception). Global Engagement makes no assertion for a role for the Air Force in democratization efforts though it obviously can contribute to stabilization efforts by defeating or containing belligerents. Like the Army and Navy, force modernization depends on increased funding. However, unlike the others it advocates a program of aggressive privatization and base re-capitalization to fund modernization.

### **Emerging Doctrines and the "Selective School of Security Policy"**

The "Selective School" also defines a robust US global presence as necessary. But it focuses on preventing Cold War threats from emerging, countering any potential Eurasian rival and increased allied burden sharing as its central thrust. It calls for the services to focus on: forward presence; a full spectrum of capabilities to support two MRC's or vital SSC's; a nuclear deterrent force and continued force modernization with emerging technologies. However, it de-emphasizes peripheral missions including environmental and humanitarian operations. It advocates "preventative defense" through increased

intelligence, power projection and decisive force as its primary security mechanism. While it de-emphasizes humanitarian operations, it recognizes their necessity in areas vital to US interests.

Forward From the Sea postures the Navy to meet most of the demands of the selective school. Forward deployed presence, continued emphasis of forward basing, and emphasis on regional conflict essentially fulfills the demands of preventative defense. It continues to emphasize a continued nuclear capability as a deterrent force. Advocating USMC capabilities along with sea power to support humanitarian operations beyond those needed to support the force is a doctrinal distraction, as is the ability to answer to peripheral missions. Emphasis on littoral warfare and urban operations aligns with the notion of pivotal and vital nations as most have significant coastal areas and urban centers. Greater emphasis is required on rapid power projection and intelligence. Long term sustainability and modernization are conceptually less problematic under the selective school with emphasis on increased funding and decreased commitments.

Army Vision 2010 postulates a broad range of capabilities to meet the demands of the selective school. Emphasis on forward presence, active engagement with other land forces and the full spectrum of operations of war fighting skills supports the notion of "preventative defense." The emphasis of six of its seven operational requirements on war fighting skills fulfills its deterrence role. The remaining area, humanitarian, is probably correctly emphasized relative to the importance of the mission area in the doctrinal construct. However, the Army should decrease its role as the "force of decision" in these operations through increased allied integration. Power projection is a critical element of the selective school and a serious shortfall for the Army. The "Interim Brigade" concept answers the needs of "B" list concerns but may not completely answer the demands of future potential "A list, near peer" rivals. Modernization and provisioning the "Interim Brigade," is probably still unachievable at current funding levels as the selective school will continue to place demands on the Army to provide forces in "strategically valuable" regions. Finally, the ability to answer two MRC's remains high risk though it is better served with increased emphasis on the importance of power projection and technological improvement.

Global Engagement is well suited to answer the schools demands for a rapidly deployable and decisive force to deter war and to counter WMD through preventative defense and timely response. It maintains a robust nuclear deterrent force and places great emphasis on intelligence gathering via space and air-breathing systems. It emphasizes force modernization and increased use of technology to ensure security.



However, while it places most of its doctrinal emphasis on war fighting skill, it does not emphasize forward presence. Rather, it advocates increased posturing for CONUS based power. Its EAF concept provides tailored forces to meet varying contingency requirements and it supports global mobility as a core capability. Global Engagement makes no assertion for a role for the Air Force in peripheral missions such as democratization efforts though it obviously can contribute to stabilization efforts by defeating or containing belligerents. Force modernization is more achievable through a combination of reduced commitments and aggressive privatization and base re-capitalization programs. However, the cost of emerging air and space technology is high and unlikely to be completely fulfilled.

### **Emerging Doctrines and the “Disengagement School of Security Policy”**

The “Disengagement School” places the most radical demands on the services. None of the services have focussed on the possibilities of this doctrine except for recognizing the potential for reduced forward presence due to basing rights problems. It defines a retrenched US global military and greater domestic and international economic focus as the best way to ensure long term security and stability its central thrust. It rejects the notion of a peer rival and calls for the services to: radically reduce forward presence; maintain a full spectrum capabilities to meet one MRC in the Middle East; maintain a nuclear deterrent force, and to continue with force modernization with emerging technologies. Peripheral missions such as environmental, criminal and humanitarian operations would be largely accomplished by other government agencies. It recognizes five keys to military focus: nuclear deterrence as the international security equalizer; defense against WMD and terrorism; the ability to strike quickly and decisively in the Middle East from the US; maintenance of a robust global mobility force and the continued maintenance of POMCU in Europe and Asia. Certainly, the atmosphere in NATO, ASEAN and among the Asian bilateral treaty nations does not indicate a strong desire for a retrenched US military presence.

With defense funding advocated in the 120 billion-dollar range radical solutions can only be conjectured. The existing force structure of the services could all be essentially halved. The force mixture could be restructured as asymmetrical with greater emphasis likely placed on Air Force and Army conventional forces and naval sea-lift to meet the Middle Eastern threat. The USMC could be eliminated or integrated into the Army. The nuclear triad would likely depend more heavily on ICBM's due to the expense of bombers and submarines. Air Force power projection would likely gain at the expense naval forward

presence due to the costs of maintaining a large carrier fleet (even six carrier battle groups would be astronomically expensive relative to Air Force wings) and the de-emphasis of forward presence in the doctrine. The possibilities are endless and beyond the scope of this monograph. However, certain things are highly probable; increased emphasis on space based intelligence would surface as a major requirement due to its omnipresent capability; significant problems with modernization and funding for research and development would surface (since much of research and development costs are sunk cost and the need for it would not decrease under this doctrine it could easily consume one-third of the defense budget) and the military could become such a scarce resource that its employment would be carefully husbanded and finally it would be such a small part of US society that it could become irrelevant.

### **Conclusions**

Security doctrine cannot be properly developed in a vacuum. It must accommodate the current understanding of international politics, historical perspectives, the realities of national resources, the relative position of the nation in the global order and the goals and aspirations of the society it defends. Change and uncertainty are the trademark characteristics of the emerging strategic environment. The notion of security is assuming a more multidimensional and comprehensive character. It is almost impossible to separate economic prosperity and national security. Consequently, new doctrines are emerging to answer the most perplexing questions dynamic globalism raises.<sup>173</sup> The challenge for military planners is to accommodate these characteristics while providing an appropriate defense mechanism that remaining within finite resource limits. To do this planners must be cognizant of the potential doctrinal changes driven by both the internal and external catalyst. The US armed services have taken definitive steps to satisfy these many demands. They have produced a series of coherent doctrines that while challenged by current demands, provide flexibility and recognize both the core and evolving interests of America.

The traditional American problem solving approach involving distilling problems into mathematical like equations with linear solution paths and quantifiable ends or taking them apart, resolving them in digestible portions and then reassembling them to reach a solution is no longer universally applicable. Nations in complex systems routinely demonstrate they do not respond rationally or predictably to their environment. The end of the Cold War removed the controls that caused nations to operate in reasonably predictable

patterns. Consequently, new assumptions must be introduced into decision making. It is imperative that these assumptions are well defined and thoroughly validated. Peter Senge, Dietrich Dorner and others provide insight into how to evaluate and validate assumptions. However, assumptions are not static. Once established, they must be constantly reevaluated through a feedback mechanism to determine their relevance to the policies and strategies they support.

History provides a number of backdrops to contrast doctrine against. One of the most prominent is that national strength, foreign policy and economic prosperity are inseparable elements of nation's security chemistry. The rise and fall of great nations has been most commonly a function of lengthy conflict, the efficiency of the states productive capabilities and the relative prosperity or wealth of the nation relative to the international structure it operates within. However, other prominent themes also appear to determine the fall of great nations; failure to grasp the nature of a dynamic and complex environment, proclivity to turn inward and focus on strengths or ignore international trends and lack of equilibrium among instruments of national power.

America's great strength resides in its economic engine. While the US enjoys the sole status of "Superpower," the geo-strategic environment indicates the US is not alone in the "great powers" club nor can it ignore lesser states. Consequently, three categories of states now define the international order; market democracies, transitional states and troubled states. Unlike in the past, the contemporary great nations occupy niches in all three of these categories. In addition to categories of states there are also transnational categories of interests (international crime, terrorism, ethnic hatred, mass migration and environmental problems). Because they all tend to migrate in and out of America's realm of vital interests each has the potential to draw America into conflict in the sphere of its national interests.

All of these entities potentially introduce turbulence into the global arena and turbulence disturbs the predictable environment the great powers want to preserve. The salient question is to what degree will the great nations be willing to risk national treasure to preserve predictability and stability. The US will continue to intervene in those areas of historic and strategic interest as well as areas where altruism prevails. However, globalism makes it harder to define areas of strategic interest. As a consequence, three schools of security policy have emerged: Dynamic, Selective and Disengagement. While each proposes a

different view of the future of US security policy, all agree on the necessity of security and continued economic prosperity in an international economic system to guarantee America's future.

Continued engagement is the only reasonable course available to the US in a dynamic world marked by ambiguity and uncertainty. Consequently, the US will continue to enter into affairs of peripheral interest with limited goals. The doctrine proposed by the school of disengagement while founded on a number of indisputable geopolitical facts does not recognize the detrimental historical lessons of isolation (regardless of qualifiers) or loss of equilibrium among instruments of national power. Further, it does not recognize that while the US may elect to militarily isolate itself, its competitors have no obligation to oblige US doctrine or avoid exploiting a weakened America. Just the opposite should be expected in a highly competitive global arena. Fortunately the US will continue to be first among equals for the near to mid-term. Consequently, it is reasonable to assume America will take a path that follows either the dynamic or selective school of security policy. The difference in the two for military planners rests primarily in the role of the military in peripheral missions. Since, no other institution possesses the capabilities to meet the needs of these sometimes vital interests the military should anticipate continued participation in humanitarian, democratization and SSC operations.

The level of military involvement in security missions will likely decrease somewhat in response to two realities. First, senior Defense Department leaders have made it clear that the services are overextended.<sup>174</sup> Second, the recent experience in Kosovo demonstrated limits of the nearly invincible capabilities of American military power to accomplish diplomatic goals. Slobadan Milosevic clearly demonstrated the ability of a smaller state to thwart US military capability. His employment of asymmetric capabilities reinforced the realization that a determined lesser state can rise to a highly competitive status, stalemate military efforts and totally disrupt diplomatic efforts.<sup>175</sup> Finally, US allies are beginning to take a greater level of responsibility for international security.<sup>176</sup>

Defense planning by its very nature is future oriented. Since the process of developing and acquiring weapons can take ten to fifteen years military establishments have to make projections over a twenty to thirty year period of what the geopolitical landscape will look like. This means the penalty for failure to accurately forecast can be extremely high in doctrine development. The current efforts by military planners to develop relevant doctrine represents a well thought out effort to mitigate the possibility of failure.

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## Endnotes

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- <sup>2</sup> Barbara W. Tuchman, The March of Folly, (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1984), 234-244.
- <sup>3</sup> M. Mitchell Waldrop, Complexity: The Emerging Science at the Edge of Order and Chaos, (New York, Simon and Schluster, 1992), 11-12, 145-147.
- <sup>4</sup> Ibid, 64.
- <sup>5</sup> Peter M. Senge, The Fifth Discipline, (New York, Doubleday, 1990), 3.
- <sup>6</sup> Acheson was serving as an Under-secretary of State at the time he made his comments. Consequently, his comments should have carried much less weight than they did. However, the Truman administration was saddled with this assessment and it later affected administration policy when dealing with communism in Asia.
- <sup>7</sup> Waldrop, 140-142.
- <sup>8</sup> Waldrop, 145. Holland actually basis his discussion on economic systems. The author has extended his discussion to foreign/defense policy.
- <sup>9</sup> Super-signals are defined by Dietrich Dorner as our highly refined interpretations that reduce the variables in complex systems into more digestible levels [Dietrich Dorner, The Logic of Failure, (New York, Metropolitan Books, 1996), 37-41.]. Waldrop addresses the same phenomena in his discussion of "inductive reasoning" which allows predictive problem solving (Waldrop, 252-254).
- <sup>10</sup> Dorner, 37-41.
- <sup>11</sup> Senge, 57-67.
- <sup>12</sup> This view is expressed in both the 2000 EUCOM and NATO Command briefings.
- <sup>13</sup> Dorner, 41-46.
- <sup>14</sup> James J. Schnieder, "Blacklights, Chaos, Complexity and the Promise of Information Warfare," Joint Force Quarterly, (Spring 1997): 22-28.
- <sup>15</sup> Ralph T. Sawyer, Sun Tzu, The Art of War (Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1994), 128-129.
- <sup>16</sup> Waldrop, 331-334.
- <sup>17</sup> Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, (New York, Random House, 1987), 439
- <sup>18</sup> Ibid., xxii
- <sup>19</sup> Department of Defense, National Defense University, 1996 Strategic Assessment, Instruments of US Power, (Washington DC., National Defense University, 1996), 47-59.
- <sup>20</sup> Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, xv.
- <sup>21</sup> Ibid., xvi
- <sup>22</sup> With resources focussed on disputes along the Mongolian border an Imperial Navy became an increasingly unaffordable luxury which contributed to the problem.
- <sup>23</sup> Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, 6-8.
- <sup>24</sup> Encyclopedia Encarta, (CD format, Microsoft Inc., 1999), ref: Ottoman Empire.
- <sup>25</sup> The Ottomans were superior to the Europeans in math, science, cartography, milling, weapons and horse breeding prior to 1500.
- <sup>26</sup> Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, 9-13.
- <sup>27</sup> Ibid., 143-152.
- <sup>28</sup> Lester C. Thurow, The Future of Capitalism, (New York, William Morrow and Co., Inc, 1996), 65.
- <sup>29</sup> Great Britain spent only two to three percent of GNP on Defense and only 10 percent on total government.
- <sup>30</sup> Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations (1776), (Random House Inc., NY, 1994), 361.
- <sup>31</sup> Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, 153.
- <sup>32</sup> Robert H. Scott, Encyclopedia Encarta, (CD format, Microsoft Inc., 1999), ref: Crimean War.
- <sup>33</sup> Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, 176.
- <sup>34</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>35</sup> Ibid., 158.
- <sup>36</sup> Paul Bairoch, "Europe's Gross National Product, 1800-1975," Journal of European Economic History 5, (1976): 281, 286.

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- <sup>37</sup> Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, 170-172.
- <sup>38</sup> Russian losses in weaponry and subsequent replacement were appalling. At the beginning of the war Russia had over 1million guns and 1,656 cannon. The war reduced this inventory to 90,000 guns and 256 cannon.
- <sup>39</sup> Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, 172-176.
- <sup>40</sup> Ibid., 439.
- <sup>41</sup> Ibid., 439-446.
- <sup>42</sup> Resources include scientist, engineers and academics who could otherwise focus on economic production.
- <sup>43</sup> Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, 439.
- <sup>44</sup> 1996 Strategic Assessment, preface.
- <sup>45</sup> Department of Defense, National Defense University, 1999 Strategic Assessment, Priorities for a Turbulent World, (Washington, DC., National Defense University, 1999), xi.
- <sup>46</sup> Ibid., xvi.
- <sup>47</sup> The White House, Office of the President of the United States, A National Security Strategy for a New Century (1998), by William J. Clinton, (The White House, Washington, DC, Office of the President of the United States, 1998), 5. Hereafter referred to as 1998 NSS.
- <sup>48</sup> Jeffery Sachs, "International Economics: Unlocking the Mysteries of Globalization," Foreign Policy 110, (Spring 1998): 97.
- <sup>49</sup> 1996 Strategic Assessment, 47-48.
- <sup>50</sup> Ibid., 48.
- <sup>51</sup> Thurow, 127.
- <sup>52</sup> Ibid., 131-136.
- <sup>53</sup> The Associated Press reported the US Navy was boarding Russian commercial vessels suspected of smuggling oil from Iraq. Associated Press, "Russian Tanker Searched for Iraq Oil," Kansas City Star, 5 February, 2000, AP, sec. A, p. 4.
- <sup>54</sup> Jaquelyn K. Davis and Michael J. Sweeney, Strategic Paradigms 2025, US Security Planning for a New Era, (Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Cambridge, 1999), 295-296.
- <sup>55</sup> 1996 Strategic Assessment, 49-56.
- <sup>56</sup> Clinton, 1998 NSS, 24.
- <sup>57</sup> Budgeting authority for intelligence activities is classified. This represents an estimate of spending levels derived by the National Defense University. 1996 Strategic Assessment, 61.
- <sup>58</sup> Department of Defense, The Joint Staff, Joint Pub-2.0, (Washington DC., Joint Electronic Library, CD ROM format, August 1999), 24.
- <sup>59</sup> 1996 Strategic Assessment, 61-63.
- <sup>60</sup> Ibid., 62-64.
- <sup>61</sup> William E. Burrows, Deep Black, Space Espionage and National Security, (Random House Inc., New York, 1986), viii.
- <sup>62</sup> 1996 Strategic Assessment, 70.
- <sup>63</sup> William J. Clinton, Presidential Decision Directive, "United States Counterintelligence Effectiveness, Presidential Decision Directive No. 24." Federal Register (3 May 1994), ([www.access.gpo.gov/nara/index.html/#pd](http://www.access.gpo.gov/nara/index.html/#pd)). This directive established the National Counterintelligence Center. More information on their activities is available at ([www.nacic.gov/contact.html](http://www.nacic.gov/contact.html))
- <sup>64</sup> United States Commission on National Security, New World Coming: American Security in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, (Washington, D. C.: GPO, Sep 15, 1999), 6.
- <sup>65</sup> Sawyer, 128-129.
- <sup>66</sup> B.H. Liddell Hart, Strategy, (Praeger Publishers, New York, 1974), 3-147 and 319-370.
- <sup>67</sup> 1996 Strategic Assessment, 74-76.
- <sup>68</sup> Thurow, 69-73.
- <sup>69</sup> 1996 Strategic Assessment, 80
- <sup>70</sup> Jon A. Alic, Beyond Spin-off, (Harvard Business School Press, Cambridge, 1992), 189-208.
- <sup>71</sup> 1996 Strategic Assessment, 74-84.
- <sup>72</sup> Clinton, 1998 NSS, 5.
- <sup>73</sup> Davis and Sweeney, 324.
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- <sup>77</sup> Jeffrey Record, "Operation Allied Force: Yet Another Wake-Up Call for the Army?," Parameters 24, no. 4, (Winter 1999-2000): 15.
- <sup>78</sup> United States Commission on National Security, 3.
- <sup>79</sup> Davis and Sweeny, 20.
- <sup>80</sup> Department of Defense, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, Force XXI: Land Combat in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, by William W. Hartzog, (Fort Monroe, Virginia, US Army training and Doctrine Command, 1996), 1-25.
- <sup>81</sup> Record, 18.
- <sup>82</sup> Department of Defense, Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army, Address to the Association of the United States Army (Oct 12, 1999) by, Eric K. Shinseki (CSA), [CSA 99-011 (message), dtg 13OCT99].
- <sup>83</sup> Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, (1997), by William S. Cohen, (The Pentagon, Washington, DC, Office of the Secretary of Defense, May 1997), Chapter 3.
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- <sup>85</sup> Sir Michael Howard, "Lessons of the Cold War," Survival 36, no. 4, (Winter 1994-95): 165.
- <sup>86</sup> Johnsen, 21.
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- <sup>95</sup> Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy, (Simon and Schluster, New York, 1996), 17-18.
- <sup>96</sup> Walter A. McDougall, Promised Land, Crusader State, (Houghton Mifflin Co., New York, 1997), 122-144.
- <sup>97</sup> Kissinger., 30-40.
- <sup>98</sup> McDougal, 122-144.
- <sup>99</sup> Kissinger, 46.
- <sup>100</sup> Clinton, 1998 NSS, iii.
- <sup>101</sup> Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "The Case for Deep Engagement," Foreign Affairs 74, no. 4, (July/August 1995): 96-101.
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- <sup>104</sup> Ibid., 6-7.
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- <sup>111</sup> Ibid., 21 and 33-35.
- <sup>112</sup> Department of Defense, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy: Shape, Respond, Prepare Now: A Military Strategy for a New Century (1997), by John M. Shalikashvili, (The Pentagon, Washington, DC, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1997), 1-18.
- <sup>113</sup> Ibid., 8-11.
- <sup>114</sup> Ibid., 12-13.
- <sup>115</sup> Ibid., 1, 4, and 14-18.
- <sup>116</sup> Daniel Guore and Jeffrey M. Ranney, of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, explain the impact of the current \$100B defense shortfall and the long-term implications of catching up from post Cold War defense under-funding. They conclude continued defense shortfalls will ultimately lead to "de facto demobilization." Daniel Guore and Jeffrey M. Ranney, Averting the Train Defense Train Wreck in the New Millennium, (Washington, D. C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 1999).
- <sup>117</sup> While the categorizations of the three schools are the author's, the title of the "disengagement school" is attributed to Eugene Gholz, Daryl Press and Harvey Sapolsky of MIT's Defense and Arms Control Study Program. Eugene Gholz, Darryl Press, Harvey Sapolsky, "Come Home America: The Strategy of Restraint in the Face of Temptation," International Security 221, no. 4, (Spring 1997).
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- <sup>131</sup> Chase, et al., 1-11.
- <sup>132</sup> Ibid., 7.
- <sup>133</sup> William Clinton, Remarks to KFOR troops, Skopje, Macedonia, June 22, 1999, (The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, June 22, 1999).
- <sup>134</sup> Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Statesman, (Viking Penguin, NY, 1987), appendix: Washington's Birthday Remarks at Princeton University, February 22, 1947.
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